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KEY CONCEPTS IN THE FINDING, DEFINITION AND




This is the second in a two-part series exploring how Native Nation legal
systems - and the Hopi Tribe in particular - handle custom. The first
article, "Navigating Rights within the Formalized Legal Pluralism of the Hopi
Nation,"' focused on the tensions between the customary law systems
persisting under the Hopi national government and international and United
States (U.S.) federal government admonishments to protect human and civil
rights. The article also focused specifically on the question of whether a
Native Nation is legally, morally, and/or pragmatically obligated to bring its
customary law systems in line with international treaties/covenants, and/or
U.S. federal law with respect to such rights protection, and how this might be
accomplished. This second article focuses on exploring the methods of
incorporating local custom - using more or less Western processes - with
an eye toward the needs of Native Nation legislatures and judges.2
Specifically, I seek to design an approach for thinking about how local values
* Executive Director of The Nakwatsvewat Institute (501(c)(3)). J.D., 1995, Boalt Hall
School of Law; A.B., 1990, Stanford University (International Relations). Former Director of
the UCLA Native Nations Law and Policy Center. The author would like to thank Dr. Sheilah
Nicholas for her diligent efforts in reviewing and editing the Hopi language portions of this
article.
1. Article to be submitted as a part of an edited volume titled ETHICS, POETICS, AND
AESTHETICS AMONG THE Hopi: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EMORY SEKAQUAPTEWA (Justin Richland
ed.) (forthcoming).
2. In drafting these articles, considerations of target audience, the priorities and foci of the
legal and academic discussions, the writing style, and the ideal formats have troubled me,
primarily because these considerations orbit around an important debate about whose priorities
should govern in the dominant legal academic discourse - those of the Western system or those
of Native communities? As Native scholars we are responsible to two audiences, our academic
peers in the law as a whole and to those Native thinkers who can be thought of as the Native or
tribal academy. We should be committed to speaking to both with equal time and space, lest
we stunt the growth of our Native Nations' collective ideas and institutions. My initial decision
to put the Western focus first is not some recognition of any superior or foundational
perspective, but rather the need to create some touch points for cross-communication both
between the Native and non-native audiences and between Native Nations/tribes.
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and ways may be captured and integrated into written tribal law (positive or
common law). As demonstrated by the topical progression from the first
article to the second article, I argue that truly representative Native Nation
states must make some attempt to respect and incorporate the multiple
customary law systems existing within their borders within their formal legal
systems. My intended primary audience includes my peers - tribal judges,
leaders, council members, and tribal law academics - particularly those who
are also stakeholders.'
This inquiry arises from my work as a legal clinician entrusted to advise
American Indian tribes on the drafting of tribal constitutions and legislation
and my work with the tribal common law as a tribal appellate judge. Over the
years I have been struck by the lack of a comprehensive theory to guide tribal
lawmakers and judges in their policymaking and lawmaking/law-interpreting
activities. I have also been struck by the lack of organically grown legislation
with the requisite community notice and input. I have been surprised to find
a common practice whereby elder community members are randomly
consulted "on the spot" to provide information regarding custom where the
context, relevance, and application of such information is reserved to the sole
discretion of (often non-Native) drafting attorneys or judges. In the case of
judging, there is an expectation that a tribal judge will use his or her
knowledge and experience of tribal custom; for instance, the judge can take
judicial notice of custom, simply toss out Western-styled court rules and
engage instead in the "righting of relationships," or engage in a more
Westem-styled fact-finding process to find the relevant, applicable custom
that will then be applied within the sole discretion of the judge. In all such
cases, drafting attorneys and judges are de facto policymakers in great need
of useful theories or at least guidelines for working with custom.
3. Unfortunately, until recently, there seems to have been little to no respected academic
space for tribal stakeholders to reflect, theorize, critique, and generally problem-solve without
having the discussion hijacked for other purposes - for example, jurisdiction over nonmembers.
It is important to find a way to facilitate the priorities of stakeholder dialogue while
simultaneously fostering cross-communication. In keeping with this goal, I have set and
followed some ground rules for this article. I have attempted to avoid the use of discipline
specific vocabulary as a short cut and I have tried to define and explain words and concepts
fully in lay-friendly terms. Where I have referred to anthropological or legal theories in the
main text, the characterizations and analyses are directed to the primary stakeholder audience.
To the best of my abilities, I have used footnotes on points of special concern or interest to the
disciplines; otherwise, I myselfmight have inadvertently hijacked this article for other purposes.
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In Part I of this article I set out a functional definition of "custom,"
including the identification of custom as a kernel of law and custom of a legal
nature in its natural setting. In Part II through Part IX, I reintroduce legal
anthropologist Leopold Pospisil's theory on the basic elements of law (or how
to identify custom-as-law in its natural setting) and apply this to the Hopi case
of James v. Smith.4 In Part X, I explore the national debates about the pros
and cons of using custom. And finally, in Part XI, I discuss the implications
for solutions - legislative or otherwise - to problems raised.
I. Defining "Custom Law"
A. Definitions of "Custom " and Debates over Its Use
Legal academics and tribal legal professionals cover a wide range of
philosophical, anthropological, sociological, and jurisprudential terrain in an
attempt to define what is custom.5 Some focus on defining "law" to include
custom.6 Some analogize custom to American common law or define it as
part of a unique tribal or indigenous common law.7 Many assert that it is a
way of doing things - particularly, resolving disputes and/or repairing
4. James v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Apr. 15, 1998).
5. I use the term "custom" throughout this article to capture all its possibilities without
precise definition. I hope that my entire article will serve as a starting point for parsing more
precise elements and meaning. I have selected this specific term, as I find that it is the popular
shorthand in tribal government circles for whatever the particular tribe, group, or person means
by it; as should be clear from a reading of this article, it can mean a universe of different things.
6. See, e.g., James Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake
of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 55, 73 (1997) (defining law as norms enforced by
institutions and includes customs "as group of norms"); see also Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang
Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part
I ofI), 46 Am. J. COMp. L. 287, 315 (1998) (stating that "aligning law with custom in tribal
courts promotes efficiency and fairness").
7. James W. Zion, Searching for Indian Common Law, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE
STATE 12148 (B.W. Morse & G.R. Woodman eds., 1988) ("For the purpose of a rational
discussion of Indian customary law, it is best to use the term 'Indian Common Law.' Indian
government, law and daily life are founded upon long-standing and strong customs, and since
the stated rationale for the English Common Law is that it is a product of custom, that approach
may be used for Indian law as well. Indians have every right to assert that their law stands on
the same footing as the laws of the United States and Canada. It is unfortunate that the term
'custom' implies something that is somehow less or of lower degree than 'law'."); Cooter &
Fikentscher, supra note 6, at 315 (hypothesizing that "the common law process in tribal courts
focuses more on relationships and less on rules in resolving disputes").
No. 2)
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relationships.8 But my purpose here is not to create a definition to legitimize
custom, however defined, in the eyes of nonmembers or to distance it from
Western law or the stigma of assimilation to legitimize it in the eyes of
members. Rather, we need a functional definition to assist us in
policymaking, be it a part of the executive decision-making process,
legislation, or adjudication.
B. Custom as a Way of Doing Things
Equating custom with traditional dispute resolution is misleading.
Traditional dispute resolution constitutes an aspect of custom, but it does not
embody the totality of it. Custom is more than a way of resolving disputes;
it also includes worldview, values, socially reinforced norms, etc. Further,
today there are important questions concerning the source of particular
models of "relationship-righting" processes. 9 It has been popular in federal
Indian law academic circles to focus on traditional dispute resolution defined
8. Russel Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? Desirable?, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 74, 75-76 (1999) (stating that "'indigenous jurisprudence' means the
basic approach to dispute resolution inherited from pre-colonial practices and 'traditional
principles' refer to specific concepts of human behavior and good relationships which can be
identified in pre-colonial practices," and that "[a] system of 'tribal' law aims to repair any
breaches in the web of counterbalancing rights and duties"); James W. Zion, Ten
Commandments for Integrating Traditional Indian Law into Modem Indian Nation Courts 8-11
(1988) (paper prepared for the Tribal Law & Policy Institute, on file with author) (stating that
"law 'made by the whole people' is custom" and includes a process of talking out a dispute; that
"traditionally, Indians took their problems to relatives and Elders"; and that contemporary
Navajo peacemaking uses "mediators" selected by the community who guides the parties "to
cause a 'cognitive-affective shift' in thought from 'head thinking' or negative attitudes to 'heart
thinking' or empathy"); see also Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 6, at 315 (hypothesizing that
the common law process in tribal courts focuses more on relationships and less on rules in
resolving disputes). See generally Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through
Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 235 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Custom, Tribal Court Practice, and Popular Justice, 25 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 117, 125-26 (2000-2001) (recounting how the alternative dispute resolution of
the 1960s and 1970s was spearheaded by Chief Justice Earl Warren after he "delivered a
number of speeches in which he advocated an alternative to courts that focused less on
adversarial tactics, and more on harmony, personal relationships, community, and healing");
Laura Nader & Jay Ou, Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native American
Law, 23 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REV. 13, 25 (1998) (arguing that "alternative dispute resolution
entered reservations in the 1970s via national Indian conferences, professional networks, and
government and private institutions" where "federal and state governments, in concert with
tribes and corporations began to push for negotiated settlements to resolve disputes that would
otherwise have had to undergo prolonged and costly litigation").
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in one of three ways: (1) as unique to a particular tribe's traditional dispute
resolution ways; (2) as borrowed and modified from other tribes; or (3) as
borrowed and modified from Western mediation, arbitration, or therapeutic
models.' ° Dispute resolution is generalized as a process whereby a respected
third person facilitates disputing parties to repair broken relationships with
each other, their extended family, the community, and the natural world. The
goal is not to fact-find or guilt-find and there is no winner or loser." It is
important to remember, however, that this is a generalization that cannot
possibly be 100 percent accurate in describing the particulars of over 500
different tribal societies. If the dispute resolution model is an import, one
must ask: What is the source of the model and does the model supplant
persisting local indigenous processes? How should the imported model be
usefully modified to reflect local needs and values? Is the intent to have the
tribal court use this process to the exclusion of other processes, such as the
adversarial process, or to set up court-annexed or independent processes?
Traditional dispute resolution processes and imported "relationship-righting"
processes are critical components of present-day tribal justice systems, but
they must be thoughtfully supported, annexed, or, if private, used by more
Western-styled bodies. They should also be modified where necessary.
Tribal members and others should have a maximum array of processes and
remedies available; however, it should be clear that defining custom as
essentially "traditional dispute resolution" is of little assistance in
policymaking with respect to substantive custom concerns.
C. Judicial Discretion as Custom
A number of legal scholars assert that in tribal dispute resolution, tribal
judges, influenced by their knowledge and sense of fairness based on their
experience with tribal ways, focus less on rules and more on relationships. 2
10. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 9, at 127-28 (pointing to the external resources relied upon
in the development of the Navajo Peacemaker Court).
11. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 8, at 250-52 ("Peacemaking is the process of resolving
disputes by involving respected third parties who induce disputing parties to find common
ground and restore their underlying relationship by utilizing a variety of social, spiritual,
psychological, and generational pressures.").
12. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 6, at 314-15 ("A tribe's way of life is the sum of its
customs and traditions, which are often imbedded in stories beginning with the creation of the
world. The customs and traditions provide an encompassing guide to living backed by sacred
sanction. The Way of the tribe should shape the tribal judge's sense ofjustice .... Tribal people
live their lives among kin, so a dispute indicates a rupture in these relationships. Dispute
resolution in the tribe typically aims to repair relationships. To repair relationships, adjudicators
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
In a sense, this is also an argument for custom as a way of doing things. The
difference here is that the focus is on the tribal judge in tribal court instead of
a traditional authority or peacemaker in a traditional or structured
"relationship-righting" process like peacemaking. Again, custom is more
than dispute resolution, including also worldview, values, socially reinforced
norms, etc. There is also an important debate to be had over how much
discretion and flexibility a tribal judge should have; in other words, should a
tribal judge be required to follow certain statutory provisions or rules
governing the nature of the proceeding and the finding and application of
custom? Defining custom as "judicial discretion" is also of little assistance
for policymaking purposes with respect to substantive custom concerns.
D. Substantive Custom
It is clear that we need a functional definition of substantive custom for
both communication and consideration of what is actually at stake and what
outcomes are intended in a given policy debate or judicial deliberation.
Equating custom with relationship-righting processes or judicial discretion is
imprecise - dull tools for our purposes. The functional definition that I
propose is one that distinguishes: (1) custom as a kernel of law; (2) custom
of a legal nature in its natural setting; and (3) custom that is enforceable under
tribal law.
1. Custom as a Kernel of Law
Custom as a kernel of law has variously been described as "feelings,"
"practice," "habit," "usage or practice," and "beliefs and conduct."' 3
Conduct, habit, practice, and usage connote action by people, something that
we can see and measure. Beliefs and feelings are subjective. They are harder
to measure. In all societies there is also a noted difference between what
examine the character of the parties and the history of their interaction, not just the particular
event in the legal complaint. Compared to other American courts, we expect tribal courts to
attend to relationships more than rules.") But see Joh, supra note 9, at 123-24 (suggesting that
where "custom is invoked to justify the relaxation, or virtual elimination of Anglo-American
procedural rules," parties "receive neither a Western-style adjudication nor a customary one").
13. The Western legal definition of "custom" is, "A practice that by its common adoption
and long, unvarying habit has come to have the force of law." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 413
(8th ed. 2004). Barsh defines "traditional principles" as referring to "specific concepts ofproper
human behavior and good relationships which can be identified in pre-colonial practices."
Barsh, supra note 8, at 75.
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people say they do (or should do) and what they actually do, making stated
beliefs and feelings less reliable than beliefs and feelings demonstrated by
conduct, habit, practice, and usage. Our definition of custom as a kernel of
law should require both a feeling/belief element and conduct element, as
tribes will use this definition to pick and choose which customs should be
reinforced by tribal institutions.14
2. Custom of a Legal Nature in Its Natural Setting
It should come as no surprise that traditional legal systems have already
sorted custom kernels, recognizing some as legal and others as mere values.
The challenge is identifying where this has happened. In a previous article
I distinguished these kernels as "legal norms" and "social norms."' 5 Here
scholars begin to disagree about what makes a custom kernel legal. Some
argue that a "practice must be commonly adopted by long, unvarying habit,"
or "be a long established, unvarying, usage or practice."' 6 Others argue that
14. Valencia-Webber defines custom to include generally held beliefs and conduct in
compliance with such beliefs, but separated from other cultural elements that imply non-
formalized ideas or codes of conduct. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and
Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 244-46 (1994).
15. I subdivided custom into the following four concepts: social norms, legal norms,
traditional practices, and current local practices.
Anthropologists define social norms to be "felt standards of proper behavior." A
legal norm, by contrast, is a felt standard of proper behavior that is "actively
protected conduct." In layman's terms, social norms are what most people in a
given community would consider to be proper behavior (people should refrain
from gossiping for example) but which do not rise to the level of an enforceable
legal duty. Legal norms are expected proper behaviors backed by official
sanctions.
Pat Sekaquaptewa, Evolving the Hopi Common Law, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 761, 777
(2000). For an in-depth discussion of social and legal norms, see K.N. LLEWELLYN & E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE ch. I-III (special ed. 1992).
16. Zuni prefers the term "indigenous law" or "traditional law" and would define it to
include law derived from long established usage or practice, where it has acquired its force by
common adoption or acquiescence, and where it does not vary (generally unwritten). Zuni
anticipates that "the primary method through which customary law will become part of the
tribal legal system is through" both judge-made law and legislation. Christine Zuni,
Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 27 (1997) [hereinafter Zuni,
Strengthening]; see also Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and
Separate Consciousness [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, available
at http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruztext.php [hereinafter Zuni Cruz, TribalLaw].
No. 2]
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more is required or that a certain kind of recognition of the forgoing is
required - that some traditional authority must identify the underlying value
or principle, restate it as a rule, and apply it in a real case. 7 The liveliest
debate surrounds the question of whether the presence of "sanctions" is
required, however defined."8 The most rigorous definition would require the
presence of long-established practice, recognized and applied by an authority,
and enforced by sanction. Tribal leaders and policymakers should discuss
and come to some agreement about what constitutes custom law in its natural
setting. For example, should just long established practices qualify or should
recent, generally accepted practices also qualify? How do we want to detect
these practices, by looking at the past and present decisions of traditional
authorities and/or by general community feedback/polling? How or why
might the application or non-application of traditional sanctions be relevant
or useful?
3. Custom Enforceable Under Tribal Law
A central inquiry of this article is what customs should be enforced as part
of tribal law. Most scholars argue that this inquiry should be left up to the
17. Zion describes "law" as consisting of "norms which are [applied] by institutions"
through a "process of double institutionalization" - where an institution identifies values in a
society, restates them as rules and reapplies them in decisions framed by the rules. He defines
"a 'norm' [as] a rule ... which expresses the 'ought' aspects of relationships between human
beings" and includes values or moral principles. "Values," according to Zion, "are shared
feelings about good ways in life or what conduct should be avoided. A 'moral principle' is a
fundamental value which people follow" and customs are that "body of norms which are
followed in practice." Zion & Yazzie, supra note 6, at 73.
18. See id. at 74 ("Indian traditional legal systems are 'horizontal.' Indian clan and kinship
groups are legal systems. Vertical systems [European law] use hierarchies of power and
authority, backed by force and coercion, to operate their legal systems. Horizontal systems are
essentially egalitarian and function using relationships. Many reject force or coercion."); Zion,
supra note 6, at 3 (punishment, force, and coercion are not necessary elements of law and "it
is possible to operate a legal system without police orjails"). But see Nader & Ou, supra note
9, at 16-17. Nader recounts Ruth Benedict's book, Patterns of Culture, where she portrayed
Pueblo society as "characterized by norms of social cooperation and by the internalization of
high value placed on social harmony ... elaborating a system of social control devoid of
coercive physical sanctions." Id. This characterization was challenged by E. Adamson Hoebel,
given his work finding that "the Pueblos were a complex society known to use extreme forms
of physical sanctions applied by designated... officials" and reminding us that "the U.S.
government [later limited and supervised] Pueblo autonomy in their exercise of penal
sanctions." Id. Hoebel "recognized the power of the Pueblo state." Id. at 17.
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discretion of a tribal judge as opposed to being legislated. 9 The concern is
that legislation tends to freeze custom in time and legislators cannot
adequately predict or provide for all variations of an issue or problem.
Judges, on the other hand, deal with real parties in live disputes case-by-case
and are in a better position to make tough calls tailored to specifics. But even
where a judge is the proper and authorized entity to identify, define, apply,
and enforce custom, what guidelines should she follow? Again, some
scholars say the decision should be left to the judge completely. For example,
Zion feels that tribal judges can inject their worldview and experience by
using the basic common law method. Tribal judges should: "(1) figure out
the right thing to do; (2) look up the law [including finding applicable
custom]; and (3) use the law to state the right thing to do in a judgment."2°
Cooter and Fikentscher would argue that for some tribes it is enough that the
Native judge brings her worldview and experience to bear by focusing on
broken relationships and their repair, even at the expense of ignoring
Western-styled court rules.2
The philosophers, anthropologists, and legal scholars tend to provide
lengthy lists of criteria of "what is law" or "what should be legal" that might
be useful for judges in determining what the tribal common law should
recognize and apply.22 Table 1 below includes proposed criteria for what
should be included in the tribal common law. The criteria contained in the
left column is derived from the experience of the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code with a restatement by Valencia-Webber. The criteria in the
right column comprises Pospisil's "basic elements of law."
19. Zion, supra note 6, at 7-8; Zuni, Strengthening, supra note 16, at 27 ("The primary
method through which customary law will become a part of the tribal legal system is through
the development ofjudge-made law. .. ."); Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law, supra note 16 (discussing
the fear of the dangers of codifying traditional law to include "freezing" it or "getting it
wrong").
20. See, e.g., Zion, supra note 6, at 7 (contending that the "common law process is superior
to legislation" as it is very plastic and adaptable and can grow and respond to changes in
societal perception).
21. See, e.g., Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 6, at 315.
22. As noted by German comparative law scholar Wolfgang Fikentscher in his 1988 paper
on the anthropological meaning of law, "In legal anthropology and jurisprudence, the number
of definitions of law is legion." WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, MODES OF THOUGHT IN LAW &
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON A STUDY IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16 (1988).
No. 2]
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TABLE 1
Valencia-Webber/Levie 23
To become enforceable at common law, a
custom has to be:
(1) legal;
(2) notorious;
(3) ancient or immemorial and continuous;
(4) reasonable;
(5) certain; and
(6) universal and obligatory ("a creature of
history").
Valencia-Webber restates this as "the thought
and conduct must be known, accepted, and
used by people of the present day."
Pospisil
Pospisil argues that, in any group or
subgroup,2 ' law is comprised of four basic
attributes:
(1) Authority - The principle(s) of the decision
passed by a legal authority and where such
decision is actually followed by the parties to
the dispute;
(2) Intention of Universal Application - The
authority, in making the decision, intends that it
apply to all similar situations, whether the
authority actually consistently follows through
with this or not;2"
(3) Obligatio - The authority, recognizes in
some way, the relationship of the parties,
including a duty owed and breached by one,
and the resulting right of the other to have the
situation redressed;" and
(4) Sanction - resulting physical or
social/psychological sanctions are applied.28
23. Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 245-46 (attributing this list of criteria to Joseph H.
Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code,
40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1103 (1965), and noting a conceptual connection between the
customary basis of common law and its progeny in the UCC).
24. LEOPOLD PosPisIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 98-99 (1971).
25. Id. at 31-32, 37.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 81-82.
28. Id. at 92.
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Although I do not think that it is necessary to adopt such rigid lists, it is
important to identify the underlying concerns of these scholars, as these
concerns may also matter to a judge in a given case. Important underlying
concerns include: (1) legality - was the custom of a legal nature in its natural
setting? (Notice that Pospisil's entire list of criteria is testing for such legality);
(2) notice - is the custom well-known or notorious? In other words, is it fair to
impose it on people; (3) old but continuing - is the custom "ancient or
immemorial and continuous?" (But what about considering newer generally
accepted practices as well); (4) reasonable and certain - is the given proposed
application of custom today practical and is it clearly defined and
understandable?; and (5) universal and obligatory - I would argue that the
question here is whether the custom is expected to bind all people similarly
situated but within a given legal level. This would be in line with Pospisil's
requirement of an "intention of universal application." It is likely, given the
variance in tribal culture and ways, as well as given diverse contemporary needs,
that the list of preferred criteria will vary from tribe to tribe.
1I. Why Look to Theories of the Anthropology of Law in Working with
Custom?
Tribal leaders, legislators, and judges today repeatedly face the task of
identifying custom and factoring it into their policymaking. They must also
consider when and how to incorporate custom into tribal legislation and into the
written decisions of the tribal court. There are important questions concerning
the transparency of the respective processes (the decision-making processes of
the executive, legislative, or adjudicative branches), the reliability of the sources
and characterizations of custom, and the relevancy and applicability of custom
to the problems or disputes being addressed. 9
Why look to anthropology to answer such questions?3° It has been well
29. Some, perhaps many, familiar with Hopi ways may find it ironic that a Hopi tribal
member, in respecting custom, is arguing for transparency in governance given the traditional
village political processes requiring secrecy in higher order decision-making at Hopi. I would
ask the reader to take careful note of the policymaking legal level to which I refer - that of the
Tribal Council and tribal courts -not the traditional village Kikmongwi/leader, societal leaders,
or clans. Here I focus on what the secular tribal leaders are making of, and what they are doing
with, custom.
30. There is a chicken and egg quality at work here where outsiders observe tribal societal
structure and operations and then apply their analytical skills to describe what they are seeing.
Where this is skillfully done, they may just be describing what many Native people already
know about themselves. However, the significant value added comes in the form of
terminology in the discipline and in the English language that may be used to communicate with
No. 2]
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documented that Native people have a long history of distrust and anger when
it comes to anthropologists - and in many cases rightly so. Yet it is also the
case that sound legal anthropology offers valuable tools for helping tribal
policymakers define, communicate, and explore complex modem problems and
solutions that involve custom.3 Finding custom law and analytical tools,
derived from anthropological theory, have been useful to the Hopi appellate
justices in laying the common law foundation to bolster widely valued custom
and to accommodate the changing needs and expectations of the Hopi people.
Indeed, the case law of the Hopi Appellate Court reflects the application of these
tools: (1) recognizing that Hopi is comprised of multiple legal levels - thus
recognizing that no one judge may have the capacity to take judicial notice of
tribe-wide custom where it varies from village to village and perhaps within
clans;32 (2) setting up a custom-law-finding-hearing process for the reliable
identification of relevant local custom where the villages decline to handle
disputes in their own way;33 (3) recognizing traditional authorities and respecting
their decision-making powers and authoritative statements on the applicable
local custom and/or tradition;34 and (4) carefully considering the application of
our non-member judges, consultants, advisors, and non-Indian leadership and academics to
further our highest priorities and values.
31. It may come as a surprise to non-Indians that tribal leaders and judges find themselves
looking for the legal in their own custom. There are good reasons for this, which have been
hard to explain without useful theory. I will provide one example here. Pospisil's theory that
there are multiple legal systems and legal levels within most societies and that every group and
subgroup has law, appears to be in line with what many Native people have always known - we
have different tribes, clans, bands, societies, etc., and they may have different values and
customs. See PospisiL, supra note 24. It is therefore difficult for any one judge or tribal
council member to speak for all with respect to custom as he or she belongs to a particular, say,
clan or band. So, tribal leaders and judges find themselves looking for law as well.
32. The concept of legal levels is extant among Hopis, their leaders, and their judges and
is relevant for at least jurisdiction purposes in almost all non-criminal cases before the Hopi
Tribal Courts (primarily on the question of whether the matter should be heard and decided by
the village of one or more of the parties or by the tribal court).
33. Hopi Indian Credit Ass'n v. Thomas, No. AP-001-84 (Hopi App. Ct. Mar. 29, 1996),
available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/1996.NAHT.0000007.htm (notice and
pleading of applicable custom and tradition); Smith v. James, No. 98AP0000 11 (Hopi App. Ct.
Nov. 16, 1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1999.
NAHT.0000002.htm (setting out procedures for the trial court to use when conducting custom
law finding hearings, including the development and approval of questions to be asked of
witnesses, the need for a second round of custom law finding hearings to develop the applicable
standard, and the necessity for a fact-finding hearing following the conclusion of a custom-law
finding process).
34. Sanchez v. Garcia, No. 98AP0000 14 (Hopi App. Ct. Nov. 12, 1999), available at http://
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custom to dissenters and reformers, including the underlying rationales and
impacts to the tribe, villages, clans, and individuals.35
Below, I borrow Leopold Pospisil's theory of the basic attributes of law to
analyze a Hopi land dispute case.36 I do so with the intent of creating and
illustrating a tool box of concepts for use by tribal leaders and judges in their
policymaking with respect to custom. I am particularly interested in tools that
will assist with: (1) the reliable identification, capture, and integration of custom
in tribal legislation and judicial opinions; (2) determining what customs can and
should be enforced as part of tribal law; and (3) determining when it is practical
and fair to do so. In addition, these tools should ensure that court processes are
transparent and responsive to the tribal public impacted by the tribal law and
custom at issue.
Pospisil argues that law can be found in every group and subgroup of any
society, regardless of the existence of formal state institutions.37 He further
argues that, in any group or subgroup, law is comprised of four basic attributes:
(1) Authority; (2) Intention of Universal Application; (3) Obligatio; and (4)
Sanction.3"
I have selected Pospisil's theory over that of others for a number of
persuasive reasons. First, unlike many of his predecessors, those studying and
writing about the origins of law, he developed his theory by living for extended
periods of time with diverse tribal cultures, by actually learning their languages,
and by observing the resolution of their disputes.39 Pospisil himself has been
highly critical of those who engage in Westem-biased philosophizing or
speculation without undertaking rigorous field work - that is, observing how
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1999.NAHT.000000 l.htm.
35. I do not survey the Hopi trial and appellate case law here, which would make up the
body of another law review article, but it is fair to say that the Hopi judges strive to do this in
every case where custom is raised. See generally James, No. 98AP0000 11; Sanchez, No.
98AP000014; Thomas, No. AP-001-84.
36. See POsPIsIL, supra note 24.
37. Id.
38. POSPISIL, supra note 24, at 32-32, 37, 79, 81-82, 92.
39. Leopold Pospisil began his studies on Roman law at the Charles University in Prague.
He continued his studies in the United States at Willamette University in Oregon and then at
the University of Oregon, where he submitted a masters thesis on the topic of the "Nature of
Law" in the Department ofAnthropology. He undertook his early fieldwork on the Hopi Indian
Reservation in 1952. Following this, he pursued a doctorate at Yale University and entered the
field again, living with and researching among, the Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea from
1954-55 and in the summers of 1959 and 1962. In 1957 he conducted research among the
Nunamiut Eskimo of Alaska and in 1962 began research among the Tirol of Austria. POsPiSIL,
supra note 24, at xi-xiii.
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people actually handle disputes.4" Second, he argues that all functioning groups
of people have law, not just values or "mere custom," but law.4' There are few
anthropological or legal theories out there that offer this possibility, at least
comprehensively, and it is a prerequisite for any theory to be helpful to tribes in
their policymaking and lawmaking. Finally, Pospisil's theory elements are not
too generalized and go deep enough to find law where it is unwritten.
III. Our Dispute Example: James v. Smith
I have selected the Hopi case of James v. Smith, by way of example, as it is
the first fully documented, comprehensive attempt at custom law finding in the
Hopi Tribal Court.42 This case deals with a very common, highly charged, set
of meta-issues at Hopi - the right of off-reservation Hopis to return home and
make a home for themselves and the desire of long-time resident Hopis to
protect the integrity of the clan and the village and to perpetuate the ceremonial
cycle. At the parties' eye-level, this is a land dispute. To make the discussion
that follows clearer, I will refer in a familiar manner to the parties as Aunt Ruth
and her nieces. In the tribal court proceedings the nieces sued their Aunt Ruth,
and Aunt Ruth countersued her nieces to "quiet title" to a bean field in the
village where Aunt Ruth wished to build a home.43
40. See Pospisil's discussion on the three traditions in legal-anthropological thinking
around the problem of the definition of law:
The first tradition, which identified law with custom or norms that are somehow
automatically observed without requiring leadership, legal authority, and
adjudication, made the term "law" obsolete by identifying it with prescribed
behavior and divorcing it from the decision-making process of authority (or group
leaders). The second tradition represents a reaction to the first in attempting to
define law by rigorous criteria, thus dissociating it from the body of prescriptive
customs and making it an analytically meaningful concept. The failure of this
tradition lied in the fact law has been defined, not on the basis of extensive cross-
cultural research and experience, but in ethnocentric, narrow terms in the legal
tradition of Western civilization. The third tradition, the most recent, tries to
correct the extreme of ethnocentricity by moving to another extreme, that of
cultural relativity. As a result, no analytical definition of law is given: only
dogmatic statements concerning folk classifications and criticisms (often
unjustified) of anthropologists who have designed analytical legal definitions are
offered to the puzzled reader ....
Id. at 18.
41. Id. at 125.
42. James v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Apr. 15, 1998).
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This family comes from the old village of Oraibi, located on the third mesa
of the Hopi Reservation in northeastern Arizona. Village history and family
structure become important because the federally recognized Hopi Tribe and its
courts, under tribal constitutional and common law, recognize and reinforce the
traditional village land tenure customs. In James, that law originates with the
Oraibi matrilineages. Prior to 1906, the Oraibi leaders explained and reinforced
the land tenure system by ceremonially retelling the emergence and migration
stories of the clans.' This ceremony demonstrated how it came to be that the
leader of the Bear Clan is also the Oraibi Village Chief ("Kikmongwi") and the
theoretical caretaker or "owner" of all Oraibi lands.45 As the story goes, a deity
called Miasaw held the original claim to the land but upon meeting the leader
of the first clan to arrive - the Bear Clan - Miasaw gave him responsibility
for the land and insisted that he continue as the chief of his people.4 6 The Bear-
Kikmongwi selected a large plot of land near a flood plain at the base of the
village, a good portion of which was then allotted to various ceremonial leaders
from other clans. As new clans arrived they were allotted other lands in
exchange for ceremonial or other services.47 Finally, there was a large tract of
"free land" upon which any good citizen with the Kikmongwi's consent could
farm. The test of good citizenship included frequent participation in the
ceremonies and participation in communal work parties (hauling wood, cleaning
springs, farming for the Kikmongwi, sponsoring dances, etc.).4 Over time the
boundaries of the various Kikmongwi, clan, and free lands were marked and
were publicly known." Much of the contemporary discussion of Hopi village
land tenure in the literature has focused on "clan lands," characterizing them as
joint estates where land use rights are inherited within the matrilineal clan
corporation.50
44. MISCHA TITiEV, OLD ORAiBI: A STUDY OF THE HOPI INDIANS OF THIRD MESA 61
(1944).
45. Id. at 61-62.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 63.
48. See id. at 63 fig.5 (Oraibi land holdings).
49. Id. at 62.
50. PETER WHITELEY, RETHINKING Hopi ENTHOGRAPHY 62-68 (1998) [hereinafter
WHITELEY, RETHINKING]. Whiteley challenges the prevailing view, reminding observers that
there were a number of different types of land holding and that not all clans had clan lands.
Additionally, based on information provided by Hopi consultants and practices witnessed by
the author, even clan lands appear to be controlled by the leading family or lineage segment that
controlled a particular ceremony and were not necessarily apportioned to other decent-group
members. Finally, he stresses that, in the minds of his Third Mesa Hopi consultants, clan lands
were intimately connected to and reinforced by the Oraibi ceremonial cycle. When that ritual
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In James, members of the parties' family now reside in the "new" village of
Hotevilla, which was formed after the famous split of Oraibi in 1906. The
implications are that this family's (and their clan's) lands were once part of
Oraibi village and the newly acquired Hotevilla village lands are now held and
transferred under some newer and uncertain set of Hotevilla village laws. If the
Village of Hotevilla follows the old Oraibi land tenure system in some way, then
it would be important to look at the family structure to determine which
clanswomen had rights to which parcels of land at different points in time.5 An
argument might be made that the land rightfully passes from mother to daughter
to be held on behalf of the clan (some would argue that it transfers to the oldest,
others argue that it transfers to the youngest). If some kind of new village law
applies, then anything is possible. See the family tree in Diagram 1 below to
trace the matrilineage.
DIAGRAM 1: TOBACCO CLAN FAMILY TREE
(reconstructed from court records - the birth order
is unknown within each generation)
Davvendeve Bolehonga Seehongeoma
(Albert Daveavenda1  (MarOaNongla) (Antho ongla)
Holetseoma Madge InNat Mollie Ned Ruth -ed Art?
(Stephen Albert) Garcia Garcia lonevestewa Honeyesteve Smith Smith Alvin?
(appears to be (to '985) Nutongla
youngest of 5) I 1I I (deceased?)
Ella Mary Joyce R. Darlene Loma




order was broken in 1906, the justification for and reinforcement of the Oraibi clan lands system
also broke. Id. I lay out Whiteley's characterization of Hopi land tenure in more detail before
preceding Table 2.
51. Simultaneous with the final editing of this article Peter Whiteley published a
comprehensive, two-part analysis of the Oraibi Split which critically reassessed both Hopi
social structure and the causes of the split. Whiteley makes a compelling argument that
anthropologists to date have misidentified both the composition and parameters of Hopi "clans"
including the applicable land tenure rules. This is problematic because most Hopis now speak
English and use the terms "clan" and "clan lands" to describe their understood land tenure
system. It is also possible that past anthropological characterizations have now been
internalized by younger Hopis confusing matters even further. See PETER WHITELEY, THE
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The parties' relevant family history begins in 1906 in the Village of Oraibi,
when a majority of that village's population, including the parties'
mother/grandmother, Martha Nutongla (Bolehonga), and her first husband,
Albert Dawavendewa, left with other members to form a new village. 2 Oraibi,
before 1906, was considered to be the largest of all the Hopi villages. 3 Over a
roughly twenty-five-year period, from 1881 to 1906, government officials and
outside visitors documented increasing factionalization, predominantly between
the leading clans of the village, the Spider, Kokop, and Bear clans. 5 4 Mischa
Titiev" argues that weak village and supra-clan social structures could not
withstand the stronger internal clan ties and motivations. He and others, such as
Harry C. James, also focus on the influence of the American government,
including the forced schooling of village children and attempts to move people
out of their mesa-top village to individually allotted parcels in the valley below,
as fueling a split between those "friendly" to American policy and those
"hostile" to it.56 A more recent study of the split conducted by Peter M.
Whiteley, and in consultation with older, knowledgeable Hopi consultants,
reveals a deliberate decision and plot on the part of village leaders to split their
village given increased corruption in higher-order religious societies.5 7 They did
so, according to Whiteley, by polarizing their followers around the issue of
cooperation with American education and land policy, and by invoking known
52. See Petitioners' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, James
v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94 (Hopi Tribal Ct. July 28, 1994); Verified Petition for Injunctive
Relief at 2, James, No. CIV-019-94 (July 28, 1994); Amended Petition to Quiet Title and for
Injunctive Relief at 2, James, No. CIV-019-94 (Aug. 16, 1994); see also Transcript of Hearing
of Mar. 22, 1995, at 13, James, No. CIV-019-94 (testimony of petitioner L.Q.).
53. See, e.g., HARRY C. JAMES, PAGES FROM Hopi HISTORY 16 (1974) (stating the
population for 1890-91 was 903); TITIEV, supra note 44, at 56 ("[A]t the turn of the twentieth
century, Orayvi, the only Third-Mesa village, had, by far, the largest population of the Hopi
villages, accounting for at least half the total population in census records from 1885 to 1900.").
54. See TITIEV, supra note 44, at 69-95; JAMES, supra note 53, at 130-45; WHITELEY,
RETHINKING, supra note 50, at 71-118.
55. TITIEV, supra note 44, at 69-95.
56. Id. at 71-95; JAMES, supra note 53, at 130-45.
57. Specifically this refers to the division of the village into two primary
governance/religious factions, with the duplication of lead ceremonies and officers and the
establishment of a second Chief's kiva. The analogy would be to having two U.S. capitals with
two sets of congresses, supreme courts, and executives.
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prophecies and predictions of such a split." I will not plunge into the details of
Oraibi religious politics here, but note only that our parties belonged to that part
of the Oraibi village populace that came to be known as "hostile" to the U.S.
government and to their seemingly cooperative village leadership. The hostiles
ultimately left Oraibi in 1906 and moved on to form the new villages of
Hotevilla and Bacavi.
We know from court papers and hearing testimony that the parties'
mother/grandmother, Martha Nutongla, and her first husband, Albert
Dawavendewa, left Oraibi with the hostile faction on September 7, 1906."9
Roughly six weeks later,60 Albert Dawavendewa was arrested by American
government troops, likely stemming from his role in the split and a renewed
refusal to send his children to the American government boarding school. He
was taken for a period of five years to either Fort Wingate prison, near present
day Gallup, New Mexico, or to Carlysle Indian School in Carlysle,
Pennsylvania.6' According to the parties, while he was gone, Martha remarried
58. WHITELEY, RETHINKING, supra note 50, at 243-84. A long-standing Hopi prophecy is
that a long-lost brother, known as "Pahana" (some argued that this was the Americans), would
return to Hopi during corrupt times to restore order. However, the hostiles publicly argued that
formal recognition of a false Pahana (the U.S. government, for example) would result in the end
of the world. The true Pahana was understood to return to "cut off the head" of the Hopi
troublemakers and return order to the Hopi world. Id.
59. Petitioners' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 52,
at 2; Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 2; Amended Petition to Quiet Title
and for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 2; see also Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995,
supra note 52, at 13 (testimony of petitioner L.Q.).
60. Here I summarize Whiteley's retelling of U.S. government interference after the split:
Then-Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis E. Leupp submitted a report to President
Roosevelt apparently recommending that the military be sent in to remove the "Hostile" leaders.
Reuben Perry, superintendent of the Navajo Agency at Fort Defiance, was selected to take
charge. Perry arrived at Oraibi on October 23, 1906 and held preliminary meetings with leaders
from both the "Friendlies" and the "Hostiles", where Hostile leaders reiterated their opposition
to the schools and the white man's way. They also requested that they be returned to Oraibi
village and urged Perry to "cut. the Friendly chiefs head off and end the trouble." Perry
summoned troops which arrived on October 27. Perry threatened the Hostile men with force
if they refused to attend a meeting at the Oraibi Day School the next day. They complied and
some Hostile men were arrested on October 28. On November 3 troops arrested the remaining
Hostile men. (This is probably the round up that included Dawavendewa.) The following day,
the Hotevilla camp was surrounded and eighty-two children were seized and taken to the
Keam's Canyon Boarding School. WHiTELEY, RETHINKING, supra note 50, at 110-13.
61. Petitioners' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 52,
at 2 (stating that Dawavendewa was sent to Alcatraz Prison near San Francisco, Cal.); see also
Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995, supra note 52, at 13 (testimony of petitioner L.Q.)
(stating that he was sent to Fort Wingate near Gallup, N.M.); JAMES, supra note 53, at 140
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to their father/grandfather Anthony Nutongla (Sewehongeoma).62 The nieces
argue that after their grandmother's first husband was taken away, she and her
son Stephen Albert (Holetseoma),63 the nieces' maternal uncle, began cultivating
the land in dispute.' Aunt Ruth disagrees with this account, arguing that it was
her father, Anthony Nutongla (Sewehongoema), that first cultivated the disputed
land.65 The nieces clearly wish to establish that it was their clan relatives (their
grandmother Martha and their maternal uncle Stephen) that first perfected an
interest in the land and that such land should continue to pass through the
Tobacco clanswomen according to the custom. Aunt Ruth argues that there is
a newer custom in Hotevilla that men can acquire and transfer an interest in land
by cultivating it. She argues that her father first cultivated the land and then
transferred it to her during his lifetime.
Observers since at least the late nineteenth century have attempted to
characterize Hopi land tenure patterns into roughly four distinct categories:
house sites within the village ," clan land,67 land associated with ceremonial
(displaying a photograph of those arrested in Hotevilla and Shungopavi in 1906, including an
"Albert Tewaventewa" who was "en route to Fort Wingate"). But see EDMUND NEQUATEWA,
TRUTH OF A HoPI: STORIES RELATING TO THE ORIGIN, MYTHS AND CLAN HISTORIES OF THE
Hopi 68 (Wilder Publishing 2007) (1936) (naming "Albert Tawaventiwa" and describing his
arrest in Hotevilla after the leaders there refused to send their children to school). According
to Nequatewa, Albert Tawaventiwa was diverted to Carlysle Indian School in Carlysle,
Pennsylvania for five years before returning home. Id.
62. Petitioners' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 52,
at 2-3; see also Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995, supra note 52, at 13-14 (testimony of
petitioner L.Q.).
63. Hopis traditionally have a number of one-word names given to them at birth by their
father's clanswomen. During the American boarding school period, starting in the late 1800s
and continuing until recently, Hopi children were assigned an American first name and had their
most used Hopi name pushed to a last name. Other older Hopis seem to have acquired both
American first and last names, but retained use of both.
64. See Petitioners' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
52, at 2; Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 2; Amended Petition to Quiet
Title and for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 2; Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995,
supra note 52, at 15 (testimony of petitioner L.Q.).
65. See Respondent's Answer to Amended Petition to Quiet Title and for Injunctive Relief/
Counter Petition to Quiet Title and for Injunctive Relief at 1-2, James v. Smith, No. CIV-0 19-
094 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Sept. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Respondent's Answer to Amended Petition];
Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995, supra note 52, at 74-75 (testimony of petitioner R.S.).
66. See ALBERT YAVA, BIG FALLING SNOW: A TEWA-HOPI INDIAN'S LIFE AND TIMES AND
THE HISTORY AND TRADITIONS OF HIS PEOPLE 165 (Univ. of N.M. Press 1992) (1978) (app. Ill,
"Hopi Petition to Washington"). This petition was drafted by a local non-Indian trader named
Thomas Keam to Washington on behalf of 123 principals of the kiva societies, clan chiefs, and
village chiefs of Walpi, Tewa, Sichomovi, Mishongnovi, Shongopovi, Shipaulovi, and Oraibi
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office,68 and village lands outside the village ("free," "common," or "waste"
land).69 There appears to be consensus among these observers that house sites
and clan lands may only be held and inherited through the female members of
a given clan (see Table 2 infra). However, it is unclear whether there was a
consistent practice with respect to "free," "common," or "waste land" outside the
village. There is some agreement that any person could make use of it and had
a respected right to do so as long as such use continued, after which any other
person could make use of it.7" Peter Whiteley in his very recent work on the Old
Oraibi Split offers an intriguing argument that the Kikmongwi (the village chief)
and officers in higher order religious societies had the bulk of the best land and
land use rights tied to their exercise of office but that such land did not
necessarily pass within the clan after such a person died or ceased to perform the
office. He also argues that only the leading family within a particular clan, the
one in control of the "clan house" containing the religious objects passed down,
had true "clan lands." He seems to be arguing that everyone else could make use
of free, common or waste land without the same restrictions.7 The central
question in James would seem to be, what category of land is in dispute, land
associated with ceremonial office, clan land, house site, or free land?72 Both
sides assert that the field in dispute is not "clan land" - an acknowledgement
that Oraibi clan lands in the Hotevilla area, if any, no longer exist. The question
of whether the disputed land is considered a house site within the village is a
difficult one given the recent vintage of Hotevilla as a village and the increase
in the building of home structures in outlying areas. This question was not
raised before, or addressed by, the court record in James. Consequently, the
villages who signed with their clan symbols. The petition described the Hopi land tenure
system and urged the U.S. government to cease its effort to allot the clan lands and to institute
individual, private land holding. Id.; see Harold S. Colton, A Brief Survey of Hopi Common
Law, MUSEUM NoTEs, Dec. 1934, at 22-23 (vol. 7, no. 6); Ernest Beaglehole, Ownership and
Inheritance in an American Indian Tribe, 20 IOWA L. REv. 304, 306 (1935).
67. YAVA, supra note 66, at 165-66; Colton, supra note 66, at 22-23; Beaglehole,
supra note 66, at 312-13.
68. Colton, supra note 66, at 22-23; Beaglehole, supra note 66, at 313-14.
69. Colton, supra note 66, at 22-23; Beaglehole, supra note 66, at 314.
70. Colton, supra note 66, at 22-23; Beaglehole, supra note 66, at 314.
71. WHrrELEY, THE ORAYvi SPLIT, supra note 51, at 42-57.
72. Although the parties in this dispute cite to these observers' characterizations in their
pleadings, see, e.g., Brief in Support of Respondent's Claims at 4, James v. Smith, No. CIV-
019-94 (Hopi Tribal Ct. June 26, 1995) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Brief in Support of
Respondent's Claims of June 26], it must be stressed that such publications are not necessarily
authoritative in tribal court absent a demonstration that they reliably document occurrences or
perspectives in this particular village (Hotevilla).
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court could have applied any number or combination of traditional use and
transfer rules (see the host of possibilities in Table 2 below).
TABLE 2
THOMAS KEAM & HAROLD S. COLTON ERNEST BEAGLEHOLE
123 LEADERS (1894)Y' (1934)7 4 (1934/1935)S '
Land/Use (1) House site; and (1) House site in pueblo; (1) House site;
Categories (2) Field. (2) Common land lying (2) Clan land;
just outside pueblo; (3) Land associated with
(3) Allotted clan political and ceremonial
agricultural lands related office; and
to offices; and (4) Land broken in from
(4) Common grazing the waste and cultivated.
land outside the allotted
agricultural land.
House Site The man builds the Houses are owned by the "If a married man builds a
house but the woman is women and inherited new house... [it] becomes
the owner. through the female line. the wife's property and
descends to her daughters."
Clan Land A man plants the fields Agricultural land allotted "The senior woman is the
of his wife or mother to the clan by the pueblo controlling agent for the
but may not dispose of chief- A member of a land her lineage or
them at will. Fields clan has the right to household uses. There is
always remain with the cultivate any suitable reserved enough clan waste
mother's family. unused agricultural land land to enable the
of his wife's clan or his household to shift its
own clan as assigned by cultivable areas should land
the clan chief. be flooded or sand-covered
by wind."
73. YAVA, supra note 66, at 165 (app. III, "Hopi Petition to Washington").
74. Colton, supra note 66, at 22-23.
75. Beaglehole, supra note 66, at 306, 311, 313, 314.
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Land N/A Mentions the category but Sections of cultivable land
Associated does not explain further, are associated with political
w/Office and ceremonial office,
either parts of clan land or
distinct fields. These are
cultivated by village-wide
work parties to allow the
office holder to devote all
his time to his duties.
Other N/A "Unused common land A man may break in land
Cultivated outside the pueblo" - can from the waste and
Land be used for agriculture, cultivate it (with fruit trees,
bean patches, or peach squash, and beans). The
orchards, without waste land is usually part of
consulting anyone. the village land. Upon
However, the land cannot death the land becomes
be sold or willed and village waste, or is taken
again becomes common over by clan relatives or by
when not used. the son of the deceased. If
the land goes out of
"Common grazing land cultivation during the
outside the allotted owner's lifetime, another
agricultural land" - interested in the field may
Anyone has a right to take it over.
graze stock here, and
today a man can fence it
for agricultural use and at
his death it reverts to his
children.
The litigation in James begins with the filing of a motion for a preliminary
injunction by the nieces in the Hopi Tribal Court.76 The motion included a
request that their Aunt Ruth be enjoined from going on or near the disputed
property pending a final determination of rights in the land by the Village of
Hotevilla.7 The nieces claimed that their aunt was interfering with their use of
the property by dividing it, attempting to fence it in, and by planting fruit trees
in their bean field."8 The trial court granted temporary injunctive relief and
76. Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, James v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94 (Hopi
Tribal Ct. July 28, 1994).
77. Petitioners' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, James, No. CIV-019-94 (July28, 1994).
78. Petitioners' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 52,
at 4.
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enjoined Ruth from going on or near the disputed land.79 The nieces moved to
amend their trial court petition to include a request to quiet title to the disputed
parcel after receiving notification from the Village of Hotevilla recommending
that this matter be handled by the tribal court."0 The nieces then filed a petition
to quiet title in their favor and to declare that they have exclusive rights to the
land.8' Aunt Ruth filed an answer and a counterpetition to quiet title requesting
that the court quiet title in her favor and to declare that she has exclusive rights
to the disputed land.82 After an initial fact-finding hearing, the trial court
ordered further briefing on "the Village of Hotevilla's custom, tradition, rule or
law" and set a second hearing date where the parties could call traditional
experts to testify as to the applicable custom.83
The nieces, who were represented by attorneys, filed pleadings containing a
complex cluster of custom arguments:
Traditional Hopi family relations dictate that a man moves to his
wife's village to live in her home after marriage. Upon moving to
his wife's village, the man is a visitor/servant to the village and shall
endeavor to do work for his wife and her family within the village.
... a most common Hopi principle.'
Another basic concept in Hopi land usage is the idea of stewardship.
Stewardship requires proper attendance to the needs of the land so
that the land is always abundant.85
Hopi tradition dictates that Hopis are not to raise fences around their
property. Fencing is viewed in Hopi as a means of limiting yourself
and your land. Tradition further speculates that fences will
eventually determine the boundaries of the White Man's invasion,
whereby the non-Indians will take all that is not fenced. Once a
79. Order to Show Cause at 2, James, No. CIV-019-94 (July 29, 1994).
80. Petitioners' Motion for Leave to Amend Petition at 2, James, No. CIV-019-94 (Aug.
16, 1994).
81. Specifically they requested that the court "[d]eclare that Petitioners are entitled to the
peaceful and quiet use of the above-described tract of land located in Village of Hotevilla and
that Respondent and all persons claiming under Respondent shall have no interest in the same
area of land." Amended Petition to Quiet Title and for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 6-7.
82. Respondent's Answer to Amended Petition, supra note 65, at 6.
83. Order, James, No. CIV-019-94 (May 2, 1995).
84. Petitioners' Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities at 3,James, No. CIV-0 19-94 (June
6, 1995).
85. Id. at 4.
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fence is put in place by a Hopi, the extent of the land base is defined
and you cannot expand in the Hopi way.86
The thrust of their argument seems to be that, underlying each of these customs,
is a principle that land use rights should be situated in the clanswoman who is
in the best position to put the land to a beneficial use on behalf of the clan. 7
They further argue that Aunt Ruth forfeited her land use rights when she moved
away and married a non-Hopi who did not return with her to properly tend to
it.88
Aunt Ruth, who was represented by an attorney at the trial level, filed a
counterpetition to quiet title, also arguing custom but citing to written
observations by outsiders:
Hotevilla does not have traditional land holdings as do other villages
because of the recency of its settlement. Hopi women in general are
possessors of land, however, a more recent tradition has allowed
men to be possessors of the lands that they cultivate.89
She further argued that her father gave her the land and the fact that she left the
reservation at an early age and married a non-Hopi, and has not resided on the
Hopi reservation for a lengthy period of time, should not preclude her from
asserting her rights to it.9° She argued that no custom requires such a result9'
and that she has not abandoned the land.9'
The parties, by making conflicting claims with respect to Hotevilla custom,
put the trial judge in a position of law finding to determine Hotevilla's current
custom of land inheritance/transfer and use rights.93 The nieces appear to be
asserting that, although they deny the existence of Oraibi clan lands in the new
village of Hotevilla as a result of the split at Oraibi, 9 some notion of custom still
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 3-7.
88. Id.
89. Brief in Support of Respondent's Claims at 5, James, No. CIV-019-94 (June 16,1995)
[hereinafter Brief in Support of Respondent's Claims of June 16] (citing Colton, supra note 66;
Beaglehole, supra note 66, at 314; John W. Ragsdale, The Institutions, Laws and Values of the
Hopi Indians: A Stable State Society, 55 UMKC L. REv. 335 (1987)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3, 5.
92. Id. at 6.
93. The village of Hotevilla has never adopted any sort of statute or common law to
override the traditional land system.
94. The known Oraibi "clan land" parcels, up to 1906, probably included land in areas now
comprising the new village of Hotevilla and its surroundings.
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applies as (1) land still passes between clanswomen; (2) a man has no interest
in land except to cultivate it for his wife, mother, or sisters during his lifetime;
and (3) a woman who has an interest in land can lose it if she does not live up
to her obligations to family, clan, and village, suggesting some sort of reversion
of interests to her sister(s) or her sister's female children.9"
The logic of the nieces' argument would go something like this: even though
the clan lands system of Oraibi broke down after the split of 1906, and even
where men converted empty lands to fields (at the beginning of the
establishment of the Village of Hotevilla), a kind of clan land tenure persists as
men are expected to cultivate land on behalf of their wives, mothers, sisters, etc.
Once the man ceases to do so or dies, the land is then understood to belong to
that woman's clan, to be used by the woman (or her clan members or husband
on her clan's behalf). The nieces would then be arguing that their maternal
grandmother, Martha, and her son Stephen, both members of the Tobacco clan,
first cultivated the land on behalf of the Tobacco clan, which is also the nieces'
clan. This would make all the parties, Aunt Ruth and the nieces, eligible to have
use rights exclusive as to third parties. As between them, the nieces appear to
be arguing that Aunt Ruth has lost her rights as she has breached her duties and
obligations to her family (clan).
In opposition, Aunt Ruth appears to be asserting that under Hotevilla custom,
men - not women - own the land they cultivate.96 She argues that this is a
new custom. She further asserted that it was her father Anthony Nutongla, who
first cultivated the land in dispute, and that he conveyed it to her during his
lifetime.97 The question squarely before the trial judge from Aunt Ruth's
95. There is also some reference to the nieces' uncle Stephen Albert (Holetseoma)
acquiring an interest in the disputed land, but this is confused with assertions that his role is also
one of advisor or witness with respect to Martha Nutongla (Bolehonga)'s desires with respect
to the land and her daughters. See Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 3-4
(citing Notarized Statement of Stephen Albert (Holetseoma) (Sept. 1, 1993), in Verified Petition
for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at Exhibit B [hereinafter Statement of Stephen Albert]);
Amended Petition to Quiet Title and for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 3-6 (citing
Statement of Stephen Albert, supra); Petitioners' Answer to Respondent's Counter Petition at
1-2, James, No. CIV-019-94 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Mar. 22, 1994); Petitioners' Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, supra note 84, at 1-7.
96. Respondent's Answer to Amended Petition, supra note 65, at 1-2; Brief in Support of
Respondent's Claims of June 26, supra note 72, at 2-5.
97. Respondent's Answer to Amended Petition, supra note 65, at 1-2. But see Transcript
of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995, supra note 52, at 75 (testimony of petitioner R.S.) (testifying that
she doesn't remember who started cultivating the disputed land, "but all I know was that my
Dad was always there.... So I've always known that was ... his field, and we always ... go[t]
the fruit from there."); see also id. at 79 (describing when her father divided the land in dispute
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perspective was whether, under present day Hotevilla custom, men have some
bundle of interests in the land they cultivate, and if so, whether they can transfer
these interests to another?
The trial judge hearing this case was from a different village than that of the
parties. He could not take judicial notice of Hotevilla's custom: "[T]he Court
is unclear as to the custom, tradition, rule or law of that village as it relates to the
ownership and relinquishment of land by female members of that village.... ."'
Consequently, after hearing testimony regarding the facts of the dispute, he
ordered a second round of hearings with party selected, court-approved,
traditional expert witnesses that would answer a list of party submitted, court-
approved questions addressing the issue of Hotevilla's applicable custom as he
had framed it." After hearing from six of the nieces' and seven of Aunt Ruth's
witnesses in the Village of Hotevilla, I° the trial judge found in favor of the
nieces:
Respondent [Aunt Ruth] has not shown the Court that she has a
superior right to use and occupy the disputed land under the
applicable custom of the Village of Hotevilla .... Petitioners [the
nieces] have made such a showing .. . . IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the exclusive right to use and occupy the land that
is the subject of this dispute belongs to Petitioners. Petitioners are
hereby entitled to the peaceful and quiet use of the land.'
The trial judge declined to address the questions of whether only women hold
interests in cultivated land on behalf of the clan, or whether some new custom
had evolved recognizing that men had interests in land that they cultivated and
that they could freely transfer. 1"2 Rather, the judge focused on party conduct,
and gave half to Ruth and half to her sister Mollie (the nieces mother).
98. See Order, supra note 83, at 1; Minute Entry at 1-2, James, No. CIV-019-94 (Dec. 6,
1995) [hereinafter Minute Entry of Dec. 6, 1995]; Minute Entry at 1, James, No. CIV-019-94
(Apr. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Minute Entry of Apr. 16, 1996].
99. See Order, supra note 83; Minute Entry of Dec. 6, 1995, supra note 98; Minute Entry
of Apr. 16, 1996, supra note 98.
100. It is difficult to tell from the transcript how many of these witnesses actually testified
as not all individuals testifying are sufficiently identified. See Transcript of Hearing of Mar.
22, 1995, supra note 52. For lists of proposed witnesses, see Petitioners' Notice of Readiness
for Hearing and Questions to be Propounded to Witnesses at Hearing, James, No. CIV-0 19-94
(Oct. 16, 1996); Petitioners' Notice of Amendment of Witness List, James, No. CIV-019-94
(Dec. 5, 1996); Respondent's Questions to Be Propounded to Witnesses at Hearing, James, No.
CIV-019-94 (Oct. 18, 1996).
101. James, No. CIV-019-94, at 5.
102. Id. at 2-5.
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setting out a rule that: (1) A person who tends to, uses, and properly cares for
the land on a consistent basis and/or regularly participates in the traditional
activities of the village may obtain exclusive rights to use and occupy village
land; 3 (2) With respect to inheritance, land is obtained by attending to the
personal needs of a person whose exclusive right it is to use and occupy such
lands and/or by regularly participating in the traditional activities of the
village; ° (3) Any person who has the exclusive right to use and occupy land
within the village must tend to, use, and properly care for the land on a
consistent basis to maintain that right, otherwise any relative may then come in
and use the land;'05 and (4) "[i]n the case of a married woman who has or
acquires the right to use and occupy village land, custom and tradition requires
that the woman's husband tend to and use the land for farming purposes on a
consistent basis."' 6
In finding for the nieces, the trial judge found that Aunt Ruth had married a
non-Hopi and moved away, had infrequently returned home, and had failed to
properly care for her parents (Martha and Anthony)."°7 He also found that she
failed to properly care for the disputed parcel and did not regularly participate
in the traditional activities of the village. 08 By contrast, he found that the nieces
and their mother had cared for Martha and Anthony, maintained the disputed
parcel, and were regular participants in village traditional activities. 9
In James v. Smith we have a case where an off-reservation Hopi woman,
Aunt Ruth, and her on-reservation, long-time resident relatives, her nieces, came
to the tribal court for a declaration of who had the superior legal right to use the
land in dispute. Aunt Ruth was likely fighting for her right to return home and
to build a house. Her nieces felt that she had lost this right due to her long
absence and from neglect of her family and by neglecting to care for the land
itself. The nieces' characterization of the applicable custom - that clan land
tenure persists with the corollary that cultivated land must pass only between
clanswomen - in practice functions to sustain clan and village ceremonial
cycles by tying land use rights to the clan matriarchy. Both sides offered
conflicting versions of custom to support their position. The trial judge held
hearings to find the custom law of their village. He heard competing arguments
from the parties' traditional experts about the applicable custom. Ultimately he
103. Id. at 2-4.
104. Id. at 3-4.
105. Id. it 3.
106. Id. at2.
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assumed that Ruth and her sister Mollie (the nieces' mother) acquired some
interests in the disputed land. The judge then applied the tests he constructed
from the testimony of the nieces' experts that conditioned the maintenance of
land use rights on appropriate personal conduct - specifically, caring for one's
parents, making a proper use of land, and participation in village ceremonial life.
Below I use the facts, arguments, and findings made in this case to explore
Pospisil's basic elements of law and their implications for working with
custom in general.
IV Legal Levels & Multiple Legal Systems
Any human society, I postulate, does not possess a single
consistent legal system, but as many such systems as there are
functioning subgroups. Conversely, everyfunctioning subgroup of
a society regulates the relations of its members by its own legal
system, which is of necessity different, at least in some respects,
from those of the other subgroups. "O
Nonmember judges, as well as other outsiders, may fail to see the legal
structure in tribal societies below the level of the tribal councils and courts.
This may also be true where member judges come from different villages or
clans than the parties before them. This has to do in large part with the
outsider's biases and lack of knowledge of the multiple groups and subgroups
that make up any given contemporary tribal society. Pospisil would say tribal
societies have multiple legal levels and legal systems."' He would also say
110. POSPISL, supra note 24, at 98-99.
111. Id. at 98-99. Contemporary law and anthropology scholars call this "legal pluralism"
of the early, non-ethnic type, the existence of multiple sites where law could be generated,
where every social subgroup had its own internal law, such as families, clans, and communities.
This is to be distinguished from at least six other types of legal pluralism: (1) colonial
pluralism, asking the question whether newly independent, for example African, states would
succeed in becoming unified nations given pre-existing and colonially reinforced ethnic
divisions; (2) the way the state acknowledges diverse social fields within society and represents
itself ideologically and organizationally in relation to them; (3) the internal diversity of state
administration, the multiple directions in which its official subparts struggle and compete for
legal authority; (4) the ways in which the state itself competes with other states in larger arenas
(such as the EU) and the world beyond; (5) the way in which the state is interdigitated
(internally and externally) with non-governmental, semi-autonomous social fields that generate
their own (non-legal) obligatory norms to which they can induce or coerce compliance; and (6)
the ways in which law may depend on the collaboration of non-state social fields for its
implementation. Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal
Anthropology, 1949-1999, in LAWANDANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 346,356 n.4, 356-58 (Sally
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that within each level one will find some type of authority, advisement, or
decision-making, and the principles underlying such decisions (law)." 2
Indeed, contemporary tribal societies are comprised of a variety of kin-based,
ceremonial, and secular groups, among others. Each group or subgroup has
its own customs and these likely vary from group to group (subgroup to
subgroup), even within the same tribe. The exception, of course, would be
where either the tribal council or court has legislated or taken judicial notice
of standardized customs that will be applicable to all members regardless of
their group or subgroup. Such legislation or decision-making is effectively
policymaking - taking "a definite course or method of action selected from
among alternatives to... guide and determine present and future decisions.", "
The existence of multiple legal levels and systems, from a policymaking
perspective, make it important to: (1) identify the relevant groups and
subgroups whose members are implicated in proposed legislation or in a given
decision; and (2) note any "traditional rules of jurisdiction" that might be
applicable and consider deferring to the decision-making authority from that
group or subgroup; or (3) if handling things at the tribal level, identify the
group's (subgroup's) relevant custom and apply it to the group where fair and
practical.
Falk Moore ed., 2004).
112. Pospisil argues that this is due to the Western observer's tendency to default to their
own Western "folk categories of law" (the system of interpretation of a particular group of
human beings who participate in social events and then interpret them):
The legal thought that regards abstract rules, embodied within the coded law of
civilized peoples... as the proper and exclusive manifestation of law, represents
the major legal tradition in western Europe .... The origin of the emphasis on
abstract rules in the legal sphere has a long cultural history and dates back to the
Babylonia of Hammurabi and to the origin of the notion of natural law (c. 2,000
B.C.), a conception of law which was considered universally applicable and an
abstract divine command to all mankind .... [A]nthropologists.. . influenced by
Western legalistic tradition in general or by some legal scholars in particular,
conceptualized law too narrowly, so the concept was inapplicable to primitive
societies. In other words, they concluded that some societies were simply lawless.
POsPIsIL, supra note 24, at 13, 20.
113. The Merriam- Webster Dictionary defines "policy" as "a definite course or method of
action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine
present and future decisions." MERRLAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY (2008), http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy.
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Pospisil also speaks of "de facto centers of legal power.""' 4 This is simply
that legal level with the most enforcement power. For contemporary tribal
purposes, this is the federally recognized governing body, usually the tribal
council, court, and police, as opposed to those of subgroups (villages, clans,
religious societies, etc.). There are two important issues to focus on with
respect to the interaction of de facto centers of legal power and other legal
levels: (1) when and how should the council or court enforce the decisions
of traditional or local authorit3ies; 5 and (2) what legal remedies should the
tribal council or court apply to breaches of legislated or judicially noticed
custom?
Using James v. Smith, as an example, we can see the implications of the
presence of different legal levels.1"' If we were to inventory the multiple legal
levels and systems at issue in this case, we would need to include two villages,
Oraibi and Hotevilla, the clan of the parties, Tobacco (the parties are all of the
same clan here), and any religious societies for which clan members have
primary responsibilities.117 Now we ask the question, whose custom of land
114. "The center of [legal] power" is "that legal level whose authorities pass decisions that
prevail in situations of conflict with similarjudgments of authorities of groups from other legal
levels." In the long run, the center of power can shift, affecting "the relative amount of power
at the various levels within a society, with the result that the center of power ... may shift its
position to another level." POsPIsIL, supra note 24, at 115, 118.
115. This has been of special concern in the Hopi tribal courts given that the Hopi
Constitution explicitly recognizes the powers of the individual Hopi villages to decide matters
within their reservedjurisdiction. See, e.g., Honie v. Hopi Tribal Hous. Auth., No. 96AP000007
(Hopi App. Ct. Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions
opfolder/1998.NAHT.0000002.htm. Honie sets out an elaborate notice and hearing process for
the tribal court certification and enforcement of village level decisions: (1) a village or
individual may request certification, id. 39; (2) the trial court "must hold an evidentiary
hearing" upon such a petition to determine whether notice was provided by the village authority
to interested parties at the village level before the village made its decision, id. 36; (3) the
burden is on the "petitioner or party who is requesting the trial court's certification" to establish
"by clear and convincing evidence" that the village "provided a fundamentally fair opportunity
[to be heard] to all interested parties in the village decision-making process," id. 43; and (4)
notice of the tribal court certification hearing must be published in "a publication of general
circulation in the Hopi jurisdiction," be "post[ed] ... at the village community center," and
"include the names of any known interested parties," the location of any disputed property, and
"the time and date of the tribal court's certification hearing," id. 52.
116. James v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94, at 2-4 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Apr. 17, 1998).
117. Indeed the Hopi Constitution explicitly recognizes multiple legal levels. See, e.g, Hopi
CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The following powers ... are reserved to the individual villages: ... (b)
To adjust family disputes and regulate family relations of members of the villages. (c) To
regulate the inheritance of property of the members of the villages. (d) To assign farming land,
subject to the provision of Article VII."); see also id. art. VII ("Assignment of use of farming
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tenure are we looking for? Oraibi's? Hotevilla's? The clan's? How does the
religious society, if any, factor in? The first hurdle for the trial judge in this
case was to determine whether he could take judicial notice of custom
reservation-wide. He could not, given that the Hopi Tribe is comprised of
twelve different villages and that the judge was not from the same part of the
reservation, much less the same village as the parties. Indeed, the judge here
opted to hold hearings to find custom at the level of the Village of Hotevilla.
All parties in James asserted that village level custom was applicable."'
However, in reviewing the pleadings and transcripts, I discovered a
conflicting assertion. In the nieces' pleadings there is a reference to a
potential sub-village level authority - their clan uncle Stephen Albert. The
nieces claim they sought his advice on how the property should be distributed:
Petitioners [the nieces] sent a letter to [Aunt Ruth's husband]
giving [Aunt Ruth], her husband and their family notice to remove
the poles and trees from their land in Hotevilla. The letter further
indicated that [the nieces] had gone to their Uncle Stephen
(Holetseoma) Albert for advice as far back as in 1985, and he had
informed them that [Aunt Ruth] had been "disowned" by her
mother, Bolehonga, because [Aunt Ruth] had married outside the
Hopi Tribe and had left the Hopi Reservation." 9
Clearly, the nieces looked to their clan uncle as some sort of clan authority and
were arguing, in a roundabout way, that his decision should be noted and
enforced by the tribal court. Because of Uncle Stephen's unavailability as a
witness due to age and ill health, his act of advisement was not considered or
factored into the final decision of the trial judge on the record. 2
land within the traditional clan holdings of the villages of... and within the established village
holdings of... Hotevilla ... shall be made by each village according to its established custom,
or such rules as it may lay down under a village Constitution .... ").
118. Petitioners' Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 84, at 1-2; Brief in
Support of Respondent's Claims of June 26, supra note 72, at 2.
119. Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at 5, 13. Tribal judges and
scholars looking for all relevant legal levels must carefully consider the subtler assertions or the
underlying assumptions of the parties, as they may not understand how to fit custom-based
arguments into their pleadings in the Western law matrix and process.
120. Minute Entry of Apr. 16, 1996, supra note 98, at 2; Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22,
1995, supra note 52, at 24-28; Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 27, 1997, at 25-30, 48, 53-56,
James, No. CIV-019-94.
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If James had been litigated after the Hopi Appellate Court's opinion in
Sanchez.' in 1999, the trial judge would have faced a jurisdictional problem
under the Hopi constitutional and common law. In Sanchez, the Hopi
Appellate Court held that the doctrine of res judicata will bar re-litigation of
a matter in tribal court where an appropriate clan relative has already heard
and reached a final decision.'22 The Hopi Constitution reserves original
jurisdiction to the villages to regulate the inheritance of property and the
assignment of farming land with respect to its members, not the tribal court.'23
Further, although the secular village government, the Board of Directors of the
Village of Hotevilla, "waived" its original jurisdiction in this case, the
appellate court in Sanchez interpreted "village" to include the reserved
authority of sub-village, traditional authorities such as "appropriate clan
relatives."' 24 Here Uncle Stephen may have already decided the matter before
the tribal court, thus definitively settling the issue and barring the same parties
from relitigating it in tribal court. To avoid such an outcome, Aunt Ruth
would have had to argue that Stephen Albert did not serve as any type of
advising or decision-making authority with respect to the clan or that the
scope of his traditional authority did not include the type of dispute at issue
here. The "scope of traditional authority" in this sense starts to sound like
subject matterjurisdiction and raises important questions concerning the types
of disputes and remedies that should remain with the traditional authority and
those that should lie exclusively with, or be reinforced by, the tribal court.
Should the sorting of subject matterjurisdiction between traditional authorities
and the tribal court be achieved legislatively? Should it be left up to the tribal
judges to resolve case by case?
It is critical for tribal leaders and judges to acknowledge and accurately
identify the existence of operative legal levels within their tribes. It is also
critical that they acknowledge where custom is haphazardly being identified,
captured, and applied without careful analysis of the impact on effected
groups and subgroups. Ignoring the complexity and contradictions of
concurrently operative multiple legal levels frustrates litigants, makes life
uncertain for all tribal members, and causes inefficiency in secular
governance. Additionally, the non-recognition of traditional authority
decisions by the tribal court erodes the integrity of the traditional system and
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confuses the state of the law at all legal levels. The levels should be made to
correspond to each other and to be in agreement about subject matter
jurisdiction. They should also be required to notify each other regarding the
contours of a given authority's decision and the remedies applied. If a tribal
community is committed to its customs, it should inventory its legislation and
case law to see how the written law is interacting with the various traditional
legal levels and legal systems and decide what the preferred relationship
between these levels/systems should be.
V. The Attribute ofAuthority
I conclude that law (ius) manifests itself in the form of a decision
passed by a legal authority (council, chief headman, judge, and
the like), by which a dispute is solved, or a party is advised before
any legally relevant behavior takes place, or by which approval is
given to a previous solution of a dispute made by the participants
before the dispute was brought to the attention of the authority.
This form of law has two important aspects: A decision serves not
only to resolve a specific dispute, which represents the behavioral
part played by the authority while passing the sentence, but it also
represents a precedent and an ideal for those who were not party
to the specific controversy. They regard the content of the decision
as a revelation of the ideally correct behavior. Consequently, a
legal decision may be considered a culturally important behavior
insofar as the authority's act of passing his verdict (opinion) is
concerned and as an ideal in its effect upon the 'followers of the
authority".., if by law is meant a form of institutionalized social
control. '25
Tribal judges, even member judges, dealing with custom at some point in
their work face the question of whether a particular asserted custom was/is
considered legal in its natural setting or whether it was some kind of lesser
125. POsPIsiL, supra note 24, at 37. Pospisil traces this attribute of law first to Oliver
Wendell Holmes who argued that the best way to investigate law was to abstract principles from
judicial decisions, and then to Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, who explored the
form of Cheyenne law by investigating that society's cases of conflict, identifying law with
those principles of social control that were actually upheld in their legal decisions. Pospisil
calls this "the case study approach" (in an earlier article I called this "the trouble case method").
Id. at 31-32 (citing OLIVER HOLMES & E. ADAMsO HOBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1st ed.
1941)).
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value or admonishment. Pospisil's "attribute of authority," is helpful in
distinguishing the mere values of a group or subgroup from their operative
law, especially at the sub-tribal/tribal court level. The "law" ("ius") or
"custom law" of a group or subgroup exists and is effective prior to any
codification in tribal legislation or in judicial opinions and orders.2 6 Thus, in
policymaking, it can be important to distinguish between mere group values
and officially recognized group law as it sits in the traditional system. Pospisil
argues that the difference turns on the presence (past or present) of an
authority who acts, by advising, deciding, or approving, in a real dispute. The
principle(s) invoked by the authority in the past or present to resolve a real
dispute is law. These legal principles should carry greater weight than mere
values in tribal legislative and adjudicative considerations.
In James, the asserted traditional authority, Uncle Stephen, arguably
advised or made a decision at the legal level of "clan". The relevant legal
principles are captured in his signed and notarized statement:" 7
I own the land located in the Village of Hotevilla... I am granting
this property to my sister Mollie Honeyestewa's children:...
1. As explained to me by my mother Bolehonga,. . . Ruth Smith
[is] not entitled to any family property because [she] married [a]
non-Hopi... and chose to live off the Hopi Reservation.
2. That Mollie Honeyestewa took our mother's advise [sic] and
married a Hopi and devoted her lifetime to them at the Village of
Hotevilla.
3. That Mollie Honeyestewa, while she was living, was the only
one who took care of our mother Bolehonga, and my stepfather,
Sewehongeoma... throughout their lives.
126. Pospisil distinguishes "ius", or law (the matter that forms the content of the systems of
social control of the subgroups), from "leges", abstract rules. He argues that the former is living
law and that the latter, while abstracting the principles of the former, can eventually result in
"dead law", abstract rules that are no longer applied or enforced by a society, group, or
subgroup. Put another way, "ius" means law in terms of the principles implied in precedents
or rules (statutes). "Lex" or "leges" means an abstract rule, usually made explicit in a legal
code (statute). Pospisil reminds us that, unfortunately, both terms translate into English as
"law" but that ius is more fundamental than lex and that this misunderstanding has led some
theoreticians to commit errors. Id. at 2, 37, 107.
127. See Statement of Stephen Albert, supra note 95. This statement was also submitted in
Amended Petition to Quiet Title and for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52, at Exhibit D.
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For these reasons, only Mollie Honeyestewa's children and their
heirs and no other person or persons are entitled to this and any
family property.'28
From the wording of the affidavit, we can distill the following principle: the
right to use clan property is tied to proper conduct, including marrying within
the tribe, residing on the reservation and caring for one's family.
Contrast the principle underlying his advisement/decision with more
generally stated Hopi values dealing with the inheritance of land. If one asks
most Hopis how they identify themselves, they will reply, "I belong to my
mother's clan, from X village." Most Hopis also have a general sense that
individual clan members have certain rights to use land associated with their
clan. Many would go so far as to argue that land is held and passed only
through the clan, which means that it can only be held and passed through the
clanswomen and that men cannot hold land. From this we may derive a
general Hopi value that only clanswomen may inherit and hold land. Indeed,
in James, the nieces argued just this. If we compare the generally stated value:
"women, not men, inherit and hold land" with the principle distilled from an
actual decision by a traditional authority: "the right to use clan property is tied
to proper conduct, including marrying within the tribe, residing on the
reservation, and caring for one's family," we see that the former may be
oversimplified and idealized. Uncle Stephen's legal principle is a better
candidate for consideration in tribal legislation and adjudication because it
was derived from a live crisis, considered by an actual traditional authority,
and that authority was willing to take a stand with respect to the particular
principle and outcome.
While the principles derived from traditional authority decisions or
advisements may be the better candidates for formulating written custom law
standards, they are difficult to find. In James, Uncle Stephen's decision took
the form of a signed notarized statement, appearing to embody his intent to
transfer property. In this statement Uncle Stephen stated that he "owns" the
land and that he is "granting" the property to his sister Mollie's children. I
looked past the private property language to get at his underlying concerns.
One of the many difficulties in navigating the resolution of a dispute through
the overlay of tribal courts onto persisting traditional systems is the confusion
between Western legal concepts and process and traditional authorities and
their dispute resolution powers, processes, and the principles that guide their
decisions. Here I suspect that Uncle Stephen and the nieces were seeking to
cover their bases by asserting the accepted traditional authority and custom
128. Statement of Stephen Albert, supra note 95.
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principles and then by memorializing them with a quasi-Western transfer
instrument - the signed, notarized statement invoking private property and
transfer terminology. This is a very common dynamic seen in tribal court.
The problem, though, is when should a tribal judge take such a statement (in
an affidavit, will, or contract) at face value and when are there sufficient
indicia that it is merely an attempt to enforce a traditional authority's decision
regarding custom? In other words, did the individual signing the document
intend for it to act like a transfer instrument, will, or contract, or are they using
the instrument to enforce a traditional authority's application of custom at the
tribal level?
The implications of the distinction between mere values and legal principles
derived from the actual decisions of authorities for policymaking purposes are
that it is important to: (1) identify relevant group and subgroup authorities,
at least to include them as representatives in the lawmaking processes, or as
traditional decision-makers or expert witnesses in the court process; (2)
identify past decisions made in relevant dispute topic areas, in whatever form
they might take, and the principles underlying these decisions; and (3) decide
how and when the legal principles of past decisions should be codified in
legislation or adjudication.
VI. The Attribute of Intention of Universal Application
In . . . tribal societies . . . . both political decisions and legal
judgments are made by the same authority - the headman, the
chief, or a council, as the case may be. Therefore there is evidently
a need for an additional criterion that would separate the legal
and political fields. The need is met by the second attribute of
legal decisions, which I have called "the intention of universal
application." This attribute ... demands that the authority, in
making a decision, intend it to be applied to all similar or
"identical situations in the future. ,129
How does a tribal judge know whether a traditional authority's decision is
a one-time decision, specific to the individuals involved, or whether its legal
principle was meant to apply to all clan or village members similarly situated?
This matters in cases where the custom law principle is incorporated into
written judicial decisions and where it may apply to future parties in similar
129. POSPISIL, supra note 24, at 79.
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cases (where stare decisis operates). Pospisil was also concerned with
separating out those decisions of an authority that are intended to apply only
to one set of parties or to a particular event from those decisions where the
intent is to apply the principle to similarly situated parties or similar events in
general. For example, in James, is Uncle Stephen's guiding principle: "the
right to use clan property is tied to proper conduct, including marrying within
the tribe, residing on the reservation, and caring for family," intended to apply
to all similarly situated members of the clan in their land disputes? If not,
Pospisil would ask, is the decision legal? Pospisil argues that the authority's
intention of universal application is sufficient, whether or not the authority
actually consistently follows through. This distinction highlights why there
will be cases where an authority's decision will not be principled and thus no
"law" will emanate from it. The question to be asked then, would be "was the
authority's decision principled (is the principle intended to apply to other
people in similar situations) or political?" Of course, principled decisions are
useful for the making of (codifying) substantive tribal law; political decisions
may not be. But political decisions may be applicable in tribal level, party-
specific decisions, arbitrations, or mediations.
VII. The Attribute of Obligatio
[Obligatio] refers to that part of a decision which states the rights
of one party to a dispute and the duties of the other. It defines the
social-legal relations between the two litigants as they supposedly
existed at the time of the defendant's violation of the law. It also
describes the delict, showing how the relations became unbalanced
by the act of the defendant. Thus the concept is a statement about
a social relationship and as such it is two directional. One
direction originates in the person of the defendant, a person who
by his (her, their) illegal act violated an approved relationship,
thus creating on his (her, their) part a duty to correct the situation;
the other direction emanates from the person who suffered a loss
because of the act of the defendant, and who thus possesses the
right to have the situation redressed, the right to expect an action
or a sufferance on the part of the other party. 30
As tribal members, our relationships involve significant reciprocal
obligations depending on how we are related to each other. This may also
130. Id. at 81-82.
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extend to non-biological or ceremonial relationships. Pospisil's "obligatio"
comprises what many tribal members today think of as at the heart of custom
law - the rules about our obligations to each other. "Obligatio" is present
where an authority officially notices a specific relationship and an incident of
duty and breach. In James, this occurs at both the clan and tribal legal levels
and involves (at least and not necessarily in order) the following relationships:
(1) daughter - clan; (2) daughter - father as leader; (3) child - parent; (4)
clanswoman - clansmen; (5) clanswoman - husband; (5) Hopi - land; (6)
husband - wife/wife's clan; and (7) clan - village.
At the level of clan, Uncle Stephen noticed Aunt Ruth's breaches in a
written statement:131
Ruth [is not] entitled to any family property because [she] married
[a] non-Hopi... and chose to live off the Hopi Reservation. 132
He further noticed duties and obligations met by Ruth's sister Mollie:
For the following reasons I am granting this property to my sister
Mollie['s] children... : ... (2) That Mollie ... took our mother's
advise [sic] and married a Hopi and devoted her lifetime to them
at the Village of Hotevilla. (3) That Mollie..., while she was
living, was the only one who took care of our mother Bolehonga,
and my stepfather, Sewehongeoma, ... throughout their lives. 3
Similarly, at the level of the Hopi Tribe, the trial judge found that the nieces
had shown that they had met their duties and obligations where their Aunt
Ruth had not:
131. Recall that at the level of the village, the Hotevilla Board of Directors declined to
handle the dispute. Amended Petition to Quiet Title and for Injunctive Relief, supra note 52,
at Exhibit C (Letter from Hotevilla Village Board of Directors) ("Since there are many issues
that will need to be addressed by legal advocates, it was recommended that this dispute be
handled by the Hopi Courts.").
132. Statement of Stephen Albert, supra note 95; see also Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22,
1995, supra note 52, at 18-19 (LQ's testimony that shortly after her mother died in 1985 there
was a family meeting to discuss who would get her plaza house where her Uncle Stephen "told
[Aunt Ruth] that [she] was disowned by [her] mother when [she] married other tribes and [she
was] not entitled to anything"); id. at 51 (JJ's testimony regarding the same meeting and Uncle
Stephen's statements prior to it that "Because [she] married outside the tribe, [she was] to get
nothing"); id. at 24-25 (LQ's testimony that after her Aunt Ruth put up poles on the disputed
property she told her Uncle Stephen and they recorded a discussion of the family history,
including a discussion of the disputed land and interests in it).
133. Id.
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Respondent [Aunt Ruth] has not shown the Court that she has a
superior right to use and occupy the disputed land under the
applicable custom and tradition of the Village of Hotevilla ...
Petitioners [the nieces] have made such a showing."'34
He contrasted the nieces conduct with that of Aunt Ruth:
Petitioners, who always have lived on the Hopi Reservation, have
used and cared for the land, tended to the personal needs of their
grandmother-Respondent's mother-until her death, and maintained
regular participation in the traditional activities of Hotevilla ....
For many years, Petitioners have planted beans on the land ....
Petitioners have made very good use of the land.'35
Respondent left the Hopi Reservation in 1938. She has maintained
a residence since that time on her husband's reservation. She
occasionally has visited the Hopi Reservation but her visits have
always been for short periods of time.... Although Respondent
has planted fruit trees on and fenced in part of the disputed land,
these actions are not enough under the applicable custom and
tradition to give Respondent a right to use and occupy the land
superior to the right of Petitioners. Moreover, Respondent's
husband, since his marriage to Respondent, never has consistently
tended to and used the land for farming purposes.1
36
In making these findings the trial judge set out and applied a rule for breach
of duty. The rule initially assumes that a person has an interest in village land,
but that where such a person (1) fails to notoriously "tend to, use, and properly
care for the land on a consistent basis;"'37 or (2) where that person is a woman,
the woman's husband fails "to [notoriously] tend to and use the land for
farming purposes on a consistent basis;"' 38 or where such a person (3) fails to
"regularly participate in the traditional activities of the village," he or she may
lose that interest. 139 If such a person loses his or her interest, any relative may
come in and use the land.'
40
134. James v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94, at 5 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Apr. 17, 1998).
135. Id. at 4, 5.
136. Id. at4.
137. Id. at 3, 5.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id. at 3.
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The trial judge also qualified "proper use or care" and "farming purposes"
to include at least the planting of specific types of crops important to the Hopi
ceremonial cycle. The judge noted that for many years, the nieces had planted
beans on the land:
To the Hopi, the planting of beans is very important, for beans are
used for ceremonial purposes as well as for food. 'Powamuya' --
the Bean Dance -- is directly tied to the planting of beans. Thus,
by planting beans, Petitioners have made very good use of the
land. 141
By crafting the rule in this way and by taking judicial notice of the
significance of planting beans and the bean dance, the trial judge formally tied
land use rights to a duty of ceremonial participation.
However, while the trial judge here was careful to identify the breach and
to construct a rule and remedy for such breach, there was more he could have
said about the underlying relationships and their corresponding duties. Why
is it important that a Hopi woman (or her husband) support ceremonial
undertakings? Does her access to and use of land impact the ceremonies one
way or another? Whose interests do the ceremonies serve (the village, the clan
(which clan?), and/or the individual)?
A close inspection of a woman's rights with respect to land, as documented
by outside observers, reveals that such rights are tied, at a minimum, to her
duties to support the ceremonial functions of her husband and clansmen. Such
duties have been noted and commented on by anthropologists since the
nineteenth century:
Women . . . participate [in the religious life of the village] by
washing and dressing the husband's hair on all ceremonial
occasions and by bringing food to Katcina dancers at the noon rest
period. During many observances the women are required to
prepare special foods which must be brought to the kiva in
prescribed vessels at definite times, and the sacred cornmeal which
is used in all rituals must be ground by women.'42
141. Id.
142. TITIEV, supra note 44, at 16. There appears to be a dearth of scholarship capturing the
role and duties of women throughout a lifetime in both the life of the clan and the village
ceremonial cycle. Another glaring omission is a detailed analysis of the reciprocity between
women in support of these happenings, as a form of currency and as the foundation making
lifetime and village ceremonials possible. Dare I say that men must have done the bulk of the
observing, note-taking, and analysis, probably while they sat happily eating their n6qkwivi
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However, equating the duties of women with the mere provision of meals
would grossly underestimate the importance of their role in the family, clan,
and village, if for no other reason than that, in the early years, a Hopi woman
might spend an average of three hours a day grinding cor!' 43  Most
ceremonies involve the preparation of traditional meals for large groups of
people and exchanges of large quantities of food." The preparation of
traditional food is expensive, time consuming, and requires years of training.
Further, a review of any of the well known Hopi autobiographies would
inform the reader of the many critical offices, functions, and skills performed
by women from birth (baby naming), initiations (for girls and boys into the
Katcina and Powamu societies and for young men into the Wuwutsim
society), puberty rites (corn grinding for girls), marriage (hair washing), death
(preparation of the body for burial), and of course, ongoing participation in the
annual village ceremonial cycle, 45 the women's societies, and for office
holders, as officials in any number of major and minor ceremonies)4 Add to
this the fact that women have duties, not only to their own husbands and
children, but also to the children of their clanswomen, and to their ceremonial
children as well. From the female perspective, without their efforts, clan
(hominy stew) and piiki bread at some Hopi woman's table.
143. For a good description of responsibilities surrounding food at Hopi, see RICHARD
MAITLAND BRADFIELD, A NATURAL HISTORY OF AssOcIATIONS 20-25 (1973).
144. For example, in a Hopi wedding, truckloads of homemade bread, traditional foods, and
other foods are exchanged.
145. Hopis have an elaborate annual ceremonial cycle. I sometimes describe it as the
equivalent of having seven or so full-blown Christmas holidays in a year (in terms of time, labor
and significance). There are seven "great" ceremonies held in a theoretical full cycle: (1)
Wuwutcim (young men's initiation (every four years)); (2) Soyal (re-admission of the Katcinas
(ancestors) to the village (annual)); (3) Powamuya (preparation for a successful growing season
(annual) and children's initiations into Katcina and Powamu societies (every four years)); (4)
Niman (homegoing of the Katcinas (annual)); (5) Snake-Antelope (every two years) or Flute
(every two years); (6) Marau (women's society); and (7) Lakon or Oaqol (women's societies).
Practically speaking, these involve a series of kiva rites, night dances, day/plaza dances, and
other performances and/or visits to shrines in Hopi country. See generally BRADFIELD, supra
note 143, at 46-63 (describing in detail the Hopi worldview and ceremonial cycle). Dances in
the summer involve the whole village with Katcinas numbering anywhere from thirty to over
one hundred, with spectators from other villages (and from all over the world). Being a Hopi
actively engaged in the ceremonial cycle is a great deal of work, and one is obligated to assist
those who offered their assistance in the past. Id.
146. See generally HELEN SEKAQUAPTEWA, ME AND MINE: THE LIFE STORY OF HELEN
SEKAQUAPTEWA (Louise Udall ed., 1969); POUNGAYSi QOYAwAYMA (ELIZABETH Q. WHITE)
AS TOLD TO VADA F. CARLSON, No TURNING BACK (1964); DON TAIAYESVA, SUN CHIEF: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A HoPI INDIAN (Leo W. Simmons ed., 1942).
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events and village ceremonies would not be possible.
In the hearing transcripts from James below, one of the nieces and two of
the nieces' expert witnesses stressed the importance of women's duties with
respect to land:
Transcript Excerpt 1
Nieces' Counsel: And what was your mother [Mollie] doing in
terms of the land?
Niece LQ: I guess basically taking care of her mother and
father and doing a lot of things for our
grandfather, because he was one of the
Mongwis [leaders] in the village. She did all
the preparation for the kiva, to take food to the
kiva for him. When things were going on. He
was an initiated member of the Hopi religion.
He was also of the Spider clan, which is
considered one of the leader clans in the
village. He was also keeper of the kiva there
because that belonged to the Spider clan. And
so she did all of these things after she came
home. ... '47
Transcript Excerpt 2
Nieces' Counsel: Speaking of taking care of the parents, family
members that take care of their parents, what
do they get rewarded?"
MS: They are entitled to the things that the other
has. The girls, the daughters are entitled to
the mother's belongings and the properties,
if they stay on the village to take care of
their parents.
147. Transcript of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995, supra note 52, at 17.
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Nieces' Counsel: So . . . if ... Ruth married outside and left,
Mollie married a Hopi man and remained in the
village and the husband came and lived at
Hotevilla ... in your understanding of how
things have transpired, would Mollie then have
a better right to [her mother's] things?
MS: Yes.
Nieces' Counsel: Why?
MS: ... Because she stayed and married a Hopi the
way her mother wanted her to. And she took
care of her parents. And their father was...
chief in one of the kivas that takes on in
January. When the father gets into that kiva to
do that, she does everything for him. For the
father. She takes care of the father, what needs
to be done in the kiva. And she cooks for the
father. And everything that she's doing, she is
entitled to things. 'Cause she stayed there to
take care of her parents.'48
Transcript Excerpt 3
A second of the nieces' traditional expert witness concurred upon being
questioned by the trial judge:
Judge: Puma sen it a'ni Hopihihta hintsatskyangwu
They perhaps are active in Hopi things
Pu' pam sen yep...
Then she perhaps ...
Pam pumuy a'ne tumala'ytangwu
She works hard at taking care of them
Amungam hihta hintsakngwu sen.
Perhaps she does things for them.
148. Id. at 39.
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Pay naakwayhihta, noovat, hiihihta enang.
Bringing ceremonial food, and other things.
Pu' pam put aw tumala'ytaqw
(When) she does this work
sen pi taahamat,
maybe her uncles,
sinomat angam aw hin wuuwaye'
(or) other relatives consider this on her behalf
Pu' sen put hialaytote
Maybe they appreciate
Pu' sen put maqayangwu hihta'a
Then perhaps they would give her something.
Pu' sen pam wuhti sen naamahin yaapiqw
sinomu'ytangwu,









Pu' puma sen it Hopi hihta naat a'ni hintsatskyaqw
Then they perhaps these Hopi things are they still active
in them
Pam pumuy qa pa'angwantaniqw,
If she does not support them,
Pam sen pahsat put tuutskwat himu'ytangwu.
does she still have ownership of the land.
Turta nu' put umuy piw tuuvingta.
Let me ask you all again.
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HD: Pay pi ayan, ah- antsa ima hiihihta wiiwimkyamnoqw
Well now in this way - those who are initiated into
these things
Antsa tavi'ytaqa pi put maqsonlawngwu,
The one who is caretaker makes a great effort,
Niiqe angam hihta...
It is so, doing things for (him/her)
Me ima hiihihta ang naakwayit hintsatskya
See they are doing the things for bringing ceremonial
food
Hiihin ima put tuwi'yungwa.
The different ways of doing these things.
Niiqe pam tavi'ytaqa
Therefore the caretaker
Pu' par put maqsontangwu.
She/he puts out a lot of effort.
Hihta wimkyat tavi'ytaqa.
Someone who cares for an initiated one.
Pare sutsep put maqson-
They are always putting out this effort
Noqw antsa hiita himu'taqw pay kur hakniqw
But if there is anything he has
Pay kur hakniqw qa pamni,
It cannot be anybody else,
Is pi pam maqsontangwu
Because they put out the effort.
Pu' kya as antsa q66qayta,
Perhaps there is a sister,
Tuupkoytaqw par pay put-
Or younger brother/sister he/she-
Haqan qatu' qa amum put hakiy maqsonlawngu
They live away in another place they are not there with
No. 21
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them to put forth this effort.
Pam pay qa hihta nanvotningwu
He/she does not have any knowledge of this thing (the
effort)
Noqw pu' ' yaapiqw tavi'ytaqa pam...
Therefore this one who is here taking care,
Pam hihta aw pituqw pu' hakim it angam yahntotingwu...
When something comes up we do these things for
him...
Piasat pam put it hihta naakwayit angam hintsakngwu.
Then at that time he/she brings ceremonial food on
(his/her) behalf.
Nuy noq oovi pay hihta himu'ytaqw
In my opinion therefore, if this person has something
Pay kur hin qa pam put hihta himuyatningwu
There is no one else but him/her to get his things.) 149
It is clear from the combined testimony that, for a woman, the duties of
"taking care of' one's parents and "regularly participating in the traditional
activities of the village" are intertwined and involve significantly greater
training, skill, and consistent life-long effort. In answer to the question "what
was your mother doing in terms of land," Niece LQ refers to her mother
Mollie's duty to undertake preparations (food and otherwise) for her father
who belonged to one of the "leader clans" and who had the responsibility to
be "the keeper of the kiva." The nieces' traditional expert witness, MS, also
referenced this duty when she states that "When the father gets into that kiva
.. she [Mollie] does everything for him .... She takes care of the father,
what needs to be done in the kiva. And she cooks for the father." The second
of the nieces' experts, HD, testified in the Hopi language stressing the
significant, ongoing nature of the duty: "The one who is caretaker makes a
great effort... bringing ceremonial food... They are always putting out this
effort. '" A thorough analysis of the obligation in James would include
identification of the relationship (between Ruth and her father, both daughter-
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father and Hopi daughter-father as village leader), the duties owed (to support
and participate in her father's ceremonial duties to the village) and breached
(Ruth's long absence and non-support/participation), and the expected remedy
(no right to use family (clan) lands).
Written tribal court opinions and orders should document all aspects of the
obligatio that would otherwise be oral in the traditional system. They should
also clearly discuss the values underlying deciding principles, both to justify
the outcome in that case and to determine whether they are likely to be applied
in future, similar cases. In policymaking we should care about the presence
of obligatio, if we care about reinforcing certain types of relationships and the
duties and obligations that go with them. It is important to identify: (1)
relationships that should be fostered and reinforced; (2) the duties owed and
by whom; (3) the corresponding rights and who has them; (4) the underlying
value(s) at issue; and (5) the losses likely suffered upon breach and how they
were (or should be) addressed. For more traditional tribes it may also be
important to ask whether these duties and obligations involve primarily the
interests of living individuals and whether, in the traditional system, there
were secular, in addition to, or instead of, supernatural sanctions. These latter
two questions are concerned with whether a tribe wishes to apply man-made
remedies or sanctions to back religious custom law.
VIII. The Attribute of Sanction
[lIt follows that sanction, on one hand, is a necessary criterion of
law and, on the other, that it need not consist of corporal
punishment or a deprivation ofproperty (physical sanctions). The
form of legal sanctions is certainly relative to the particular society
or to the particular subgroup in which it is used; it may be physical
or social-psychological. I may, then, define legal sanction either
as a negative device in withdrawing rewards or favors that
otherwise (if the law had not been violated) would have been
granted, or as a positive measure in inflicting some painful
experience, physical or psychological.'
For Pospisil any kind of sanction, enforced by an authority, by society in
some way, or supernaturally, indicates the presence of law, what I am calling
custom law. The one caveat is that supernaturally applied sanctions lie in the
realm of religious law. Contemporary policymaking takes place in the realm
151. POSPISIL, supra note 24, at 92.
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of the secular, and so we are concerned here with identifying traditional,
human-applied sanctions, that may have been (or may be) applied in addition
to supernatural sanctions. However, the "attribute of sanction" is always the
most difficult to characterize in any given culture. This is so because sanction
and woridview are intertwined in complex ways. I continue with the Hopi
example.
We are fortunate at Hopi that much work has been done to document the
experiences, perspectives, and knowledge of Hopis and Tewas from at least
the time of our great-great grandparents. Much of this work has been done by
anthropologist(s) of both the classical "scientific" bent and, later,
ethnographers with a sincere concern to capture Hopi insider understandings.
According to Whiteley, before 1906 in Old Oraibi our people were divided
into two general classes with respect to access to knowledge. Whiteley has
written extensively on the power of the elite "pavansinom" versus the
common Hopi kept in the dark, the "sukavungsinom":
Power is fundamentally equated with elite access to specialized
secret knowledge that enables the bearer to induce significant
transformations in the world. Ritual knowledge is the 'strategic
resource'; material entities are not the medium of power
differentials. The structure of ritual leadership is simultaneously
the structure of political leadership. Political actions on the part of
the pavansinom is homologous with, and ultimately inseparable
from, ritual action: secretive and conspiratorial, and directed
towards the planning of society's future. Ritual has an
instrumental mode that transforms the world's conditions.
Coercion mostly takes a supernatural form, and consent to
authority is based on fear of supernatural sanctions. Explanation
of marked societal events identify deliberate execution ofjoint elite
decisions toward preconceived ends.'52
Whiteley references "fear of supernatural sanctions" or "maqastutavo" ("fear
teaching") as the primary doctrine prescribing adherence to norms.'53 In this
segment Whiteley alludes to the split at Oraibi, and other ancient villages,
where leaders (pavansinom) are said to have orchestrated the destruction of
villages by inciting internal conflict or by inviting attacks by outsiders,
justified as consistent with prophecy." In more mundane matters, villagers
152. WHITELEY, RETHINKING, supra note 50, at 102-03.
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were, and many still are, afraid to transgress norms lest they or a relative
should become sick or die.' Even so, there were occasions when corporal
punishment was threatened or meted out by disciplinary Katcinas who used
yucca whips to encourage compliance. 56 But perhaps more frequent today are
the public demonstrations and outings of misbehavior that occur in most
villages each summer through clowning:
[T]he two-day clown ceremony... Clowns represent mankind in
a pre-moral state, where basic Hopi values - self-control in eating,
decorous and respectful interpersonal relations, nonaggression,
nonacquisitiveness, noninquisitiveness, sexual modesty, etc. - are
overturned, reversed, and burlesqued in the typical fashion of
inversionary ritual. Hopi clowns are gluttonous, uncouth,
aggressive, grasping, intrusive, prying, obscene (and extremely
funny). This part of their purpose: to stand the world on its head
in order to reveal its rules and their necessity against chaos. The
Warrior Katcinas, as the clown's adversaries, represent the
moralizing influence of prescribed behavioral values and the
upholding of these with severe supernatural sanctions. Eventually,
the clowns are stripped, doused with gallons of water, whipped
with willow branches, and forced to go through what amounts to
a public confessional, before reintegration into their everyday
social identities.
57
What Whiteley does not convey here are the changing characters and topics
of misbehavior that the clowns enact each year. They often mock real people
and re-enact actual events. In years past I recall the re-enactment of the
alleged exploits of the tribal treasurer who had been accused of embezzling
tribal funds. A clown wearing a name tag designating him "treasurer," with
bottles of liquor hanging out of his pockets, drove a car painted with the words
"tribal vehicle" into the plaza, escorted by two "ladies of the evening" clowns.
Let's just say everyone knew who and what this was about, and we soon had
a new treasurer.
At Hopi we have a complex persisting set of traditional sanctions, religious
and secular. Maqastutavo persists and influences peoples' actions but equally
effective is the making of examples of bad behavior with all the attendant
chastisement and public ridicule. Some breaches of norms, such as that one
155. Id. at 95.
156. Id. at 96.
157. Id. at98-100.
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should be respectful and sober during the ceremonies, are sanctioned by both
the traditional and tribal systems. For example, if one is out of line during a
ceremony, he or she may be publicly chastised by the disciplinary Katcina; the
tribal police may be called to arrest that person for violating the criminal code
provision making it a crime to be disrespectful or drunk at the ceremony, and
punishable with a fine and/or jail time.'58
In the area of land use rights and the duties and obligations owed with
respect to land, we are still exploring the diverse local understandings. My
best guess, without taking traditional expert testimony on the global question,
is that our families, clans, and the wider village communities suffer from
functional and/or supernatural outcomes (sanctions), where we cannot get
along to make our ceremonies go. For example, where we cannot cooperate
to plant or harvest at the right intervals to catch the rain or where the rain
simply won't come, or even where the corn is plentiful, we might not be able
cooperate to organize and hold the full ceremonial cycle because we are busy
fighting over homes and fields. These functional and/or supernatural
sanctions are reinforced by our clan uncles when they arbitrate' intra-family
(clan) home/land disputes and say which dutiful clan member(s) have the
superior use rights. Where family members continue to fight and refuse to
live with the decision of their clan uncles, or where they do not have a clan
uncle who can or will arbitrate, they may go to tribal court to seek formal
tribal recognition of superior use rights. As can be seen in the James case, the
tribal court under the present state of Hopi law will attempt to stand in the
158. Hopi LAW & ORDER CODE tit. III, §§ 3.3.91 (1991), available at http://www.narf.org/
nill/Codes/hopicode/title3.htm ("Any Indian who willfully disturbs... any meeting for religious
or ceremonial purposes, by any act, gesture or utterance... is guilty of an offense"); id. § 3.3.92
("Any Indian who shall enter a kiva, ceremonial building or ceremonial area during the time of
a religious or ceremonial activity while under the influence of alcohol ... is guilty of an
offense.").
159. I use the term "arbitrate" loosely here. I am dissatisfied that what I am seeing where
a clan uncle or "taaha" advises disputing family or clan members is anything like mediation.
He is not sizing up the respective positions and liabilities of the parties and putting pressure on
them to compromise. This also is not a talking out process, like that popularly characterized
in peacemaking models. Rather, the process seems to approximate a forceful reiteration of
relationships and responsibilities with such strong advisement that it approaches a made
decision. The "sanction" element comes from family/clan member and broader village/tribal
member recognition of the advisement or decision or an ongoing "retelling of the reasoning of
it" to the point where the person in breach pays a social price for persisting in their position
(embarrassment, fewer and fewer people will deal with them, no reciprocity when they need
provisions or assistance in personal, familial/clan, or village ceremonial events). It is
uncommon for persons in breach to stand their ground for long under these circumstances.
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shoes of the village or clan uncle, by applying it's version of the local custom
or by reinforcing the made decision of the clan uncle. In this way, breach of
duty with respect to land is sanctioned at the supernatural, clan, and tribal
legal levels. This may take the form of bad weather for crops, community
recognition and reinforcement of the advisements and decisions of traditional
clan authorities - resulting in people talking badly about, or refusing to deal
with the person in breach"'0 and with the secular state-like enforcement
mechanisms of the tribal government. For example, an enforceable court
order recognizing that a specific person has superior and exclusive land use
rights might result in the authorization of the tribal police to evict future
trespassers."'6
The important considerations for policymaking purposes with respect to
sanction include: (1) What were/are the traditional sanctions and when should
they apply; (2) Whether the traditional sanctions are sufficient or whether
tribal sanctions "backing them up" are desired; (3) Whether innovative tribal
sanctions of a nature similar to traditional sanctions are desired, such as outing
bad behavior in the tribal newspaper for example; and (4) When and how
tribal courts and police should recognize and enforce the decisions, remedies,
and/or sanctions issued by traditional authorities?
160. There are also very likely sanctions meted out by religious societies and/or their
traditional authorities. However, this discussion would venture into the realm of religious law,
a topic not addressed in this article.
161. I disagree in part with Robert Porter, where he argues that the Western adversarial
process amplifies and perpetuates fighting among tribal members, fragmenting relationships,
and offering no process for repair of long-term relationships, thus threatening, at some level,
tribal sovereignty itself. Porter, supra note 8, at 274-76. Rather, I find myself arguing here for
Western-styled enforcement mechanisms backing either the decisions of traditional authorities
or the decisions of tribal judges standing in their shoes to stop incessant fighting over homes and
land on the Hopi reservation. These are very old fights that may have been through multiple
rounds (at least in each generation) of traditional dispute resolution and sanction. Hopis have
been fighting over property from the beginning and those bucking applicable norms and
sanctions have often opted to leave - still a difficult undertaking. Perhaps the Western system
offers a way to settle expectations with finality and enforcement. It is my hope that we will be
able to initiate legal reforms to better secure property interests, at least for the duration of an
individual's lifetime. Even so, I do not argue for a wholesale importation of Western process
and property law. It must be thoughtfully tailored by skillful stakeholders to meet Hopi needs
and priorities. The ideal Hopi justice system would include both an adversarial process tailored
to accommodate our customs and traditions, with an annexed alternative dispute resolution
process such as mediation - not a wholesale repudiation of the former for the latter.
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IX Justice
[J]ustice [is] either the conformity of the values of legal principles
with basic jural postulates or as a degree of social
internalization. 
162
The central question is whether it is just for tribal governments to reinforce
custom law with legislation, court orders, and law enforcement where not
everyone subject to the law shares the same values. This may be the case
where a number of different culture groups reside on the same reservation,
where nonmembers or non-Natives have married in, or where they have
children with members. It is also the case that growing numbers of members
themselves have acquired Western, individuated, rights-based expectations.
In many tribes, female members also seek to change their role and their rights
from the traditional or generally accepted ways. The problem then is how
tribes may reinforce and promote custom while simultaneously protecting the
rights of those who do not share the traditional value system or who seek to
change it.
In the opening quote, Pospisil reads "jural postulates" to mean values
shared by the group.'63 He would find those principles in decisions made by
authorities to be just where such principles conform to the values shared by
the majority of people in that group."6 Contrast this view with that of the
United States Congress, which has legislated very specific contours for what
it means by justice, for example, that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers
of self government shall... (1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free
exercise of religion... ; (5) take any private property for a public use without
just compensation;... (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law .. .165 Pospisil would test the justice of custom law by
confirming whether or not a majority of the people governed by it supported
it. Under this formulation, there would always be a minority of people who
would be subject to the custom law but who did not agree with its underlying
principles. The U.S. Congress, on the other hand, through the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA), seeks to require that all people governed by a tribe be
guaranteed certain specific and equal rights under tribal law. It should be
162. POsPIsIL, supra note 24, at 272 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 265.
164. Id. at 270.
165. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1), 1302(5), 1302(8) (2006).
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clear that many, if not most, custom law principles would not survive a test for
justice based rigidly on free exercise and due process rights or protection of
private property and equal protection."M
The principles applied in the trial court order in James appear to violate the
ICRA in at least four different ways. Aunt Ruth could have argued that the
principles as set out, or as applied, violated her free exercise rights, resulting
in a taking of her private property without due process or just compensation,
and that the re-stated custom law principles deny her equal treatment as a
married woman with respect to maintaining her property rights. While no
federal court review is available under U.S. law to remedy such violations
absent a viable petition for a writ of habeas corpus,'67 the tribal legislature,
appellate body, and community will have a keen interest in weighing whether
potential or actual ICRA violations warrant a modification of the applied
custom law principles to meet new understandings of what should be
considered "just" in the contemporary tribal community. Alternatively, there
may be central traditional principles or values so important to the integrity of
the community, its religion, and/or its economy that majority support for them
is enough, even when they are applied to dissenting minorities. Even
discriminating laws within the U.S. system are legal where there are important
or compelling governmental interests that are being pursued. In any case, this
is a policy debate to be undertaken by tribal citizens and their leaders.
A. Free Exercise Rights
In James, the trial court's re-stated custom law principle ties the
maintenance of individual property rights (exclusive lifetime use rights) under
Hopi law to a requirement that a person "regularly participate in the traditional
activities of the village.' 68 Aunt Ruth argues that her father divided the land
and gave her and her sister Molly each a half of a parcel of farming land in
166. See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REv. 799, 835-
48 (2007) (arguing that it is a mistake on the part of contemporary liberals to impose liberalism
on indigenous groups, specifically by imposing a one-size-fits all approach to civil liberties via
the Indian Civil Rights Act as this would destabilize tribal government and destroy tribal culture
and Indian differentness).
167. 25 U.S.C. § 1303; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that
federal court civil action against a tribe is barred by the sovereign immunity of the tribe and that
the ICRA provision providing for federal habeas corpus relief to test legality of person's
detention by a tribe does not constitute a general waiver of a tribe's sovereign immunity from
suit).
168. James v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94, at 2-5 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Apr. 15, 1998).
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Hotevilla Village when he was alive.'69 The trial court assumes that she has
some interest in this parcel of land but re-states a rule that her interest is
subject to divestment where she has married a non-Hopi, moved away for
many years, and has failed to return home to regularly participate in the
ceremonies. 70 Aunt Ruth could argue that she has an ICRA right to the free
exercise of religion in that she chooses not to participate in the village
ceremonials. Further, any tribal law that penalizes her liberty and property
interests for this choice is unjust and should not be legal or a part of the
secularly enforced tribal law.
B. Right Against the Taking of Private Property without Due Process and
Just Compensation
The trial court's application of the re-stated custom law principles in James
to the dispute between Aunt Ruth and her nieces results in a finding of
exclusive property use rights in the nieces, subjecting Aunt Ruth to potential
court- ordered, police enforced eviction should she attempt to occupy or use
the disputed parcel. The effect of the trial court order is to divest Aunt Ruth
of any property rights in the disputed parcel. She may argue that the way the
trial judge came to find, re-state, and then apply custom law principles in her
case resulted in a taking of her private property without due process and just
compensation under the ICRA. Again, she would be arguing that this result
is unjust and that such a process and outcome should not be legal or a part of
the secular tribal law or enforced by secular tribal law enforcement.
C. Right to Equal Protection Under Tribal Law
Another rationale for finding that Aunt Ruth had lost her exclusive land use
rights in the disputed parcel appears to be that her husband had never
cultivated the disputed land, particularly in ways that supported her father's
participation in the village ceremonies. Recall the trial judge's re-stated rule
that: "[i]n the case of a married woman who has or acquires the right to use or
occupy village land, custom and tradition requires that the woman's husband
tend to and use the land for farming purposes on a consistent basis. '1 71 Ruth
could argue that the trial judge's found, re-stated, and applied custom law
principle unfairly burdens married women and makes it harder for married
women to preserve their property rights. Why should married women be
169. Respondent's Answer to Amended Petition, supra note 65, at 1-2, 5; see also Transcript
of Hearing of Mar. 22, 1995, supra note 52, at 78-80 (testimony of petitioner R.S.).
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treated differently from single women and married men, and how does a
married woman protect her interests if her husband will not cooperate? The
special "married woman's rule," absent a "married man's rule," would appear
to violate the ICRA's equal protection under tribal law requirement. Ruth
again could argue that tribal laws discriminating on the basis of sex are
inherently unjust absent the furthering of important or compelling government
interests.
Both the reinforcement of custom and the pursuit of justice are about
accountability of tribal leaders to tribal memberships. Whether the majority
of a membership shares and chooses to reinforce a particular traditional value
or whether the majority expects Western-styled individual rights is always
shifting with respect to any particular topic. Group sentiments should be
measured on an ongoing basis. Considerations of justice, with respect to
custom, argue for the dedication of time, attention, and funding to carefully
determine applicable local custom law principles and the degree of acceptance
of such principles within the group to be bound by them. This should include
public notice and input by the members of the group to be bound by custom
law principles before such principles are incorporated into legislation or as
part of an adjudication. This will likely require special processes in tribal law
for the drafting and adoption of legislation and for custom law finding in tribal
court. In some cases, large policy shifts may require constitutional reform or
amendment. The overall goal, in any case, is to be true to the values and
priorities of the membership and to fully consider the impacts on, and the
arguments of, minorities and reformers.
IX Key Concepts
Whether tribal leaders are drafting legislation or whether tribal judges are
deliberating on a specific case, where custom law is relevant and applicable,
it will be necessary to consult the local experts and culture-bearers. This may
take the form of a formal or informal committee charged with identifying
relevant custom and communicating its findings to the ultimate decision-
maker(s), who then must analyze the information, recharacterize the principle,
and apply it to the particular policy purpose or litigation at hand. However,
when it comes to discussions about custom, committee members and decision-
makers can often get bogged down with semantics and find themselves in
heated arguments about what is or is not "the custom" or "the tradition." In
my past work with tribes, it has been helpful to begin such meetings with an
introduction to key concepts and definitions in order to create a common
vocabulary and to avoid lengthy, unproductive fights over meaning. Below
I outline the key concepts discussed in the first part of this article. I have also
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included a sample discussion outline for working with custom law finding
committees (see Appendix A).
Helpful key concepts for finding custom law include the following:
(1) Recognize that every functioning group or subgroup within a tribe has
its own, naturally arising legal system and law, both traditionally and
presently. The big question is whether and how the tribal law should
recognize and reinforce group and subgroup custom law;
(2) Recognize that there is a difference between "custom law" and "values"
and that custom law is discovered by looking at the underlying principles of
past and present decisions of persons of authority within a group or subgroup,
where he or she has solved, advised, or approved a solution in real disputes.
The deciding principle is the custom law. Custom law principles may be more
valuable than mere value statements, as they are derived from live conflicts
and the actual decisions of group/subgroup authorities;
(3) Recognize that some group or subgroup authority's decisions may not
generate custom law if they do not include principles intended to apply to
similar situations in the future. Decisions that are applied on a one-time basis
to particular parties or events are political and do not necessarily include
principles that are useful for integration into the tribal law;
(4) Recognize that many custom law principles are derived from an
identification of the relationship of the parties to a dispute, their duties and
obligations to each other, the identification of a breach or failure of one party
to meet his or her obligations, and a determination of the required remedies to
make things right;
(5) Recognize that it is important to identify the traditional sanctions for
breaching duties or for violations of custom law. "Sanction" is defined to
include either physical or social-psychological experiences, negative
(withdrawing rewards or favors) or positive (inflicting pain), and may be man-
made or supernatural. The important questions here are if, when, and how the
tribe should enforce the decisions of local authorities; whether tribal sanctions
should be used to reinforce or replace traditional sanctions; and/or whether
traditional sanctions should influence the creation of new, innovative tribal
sanctions based on traditional concepts; and
(6) Recognize that it is important to consider whether it is just to adopt a
group or subgroup's custom law on a tribe-wide, or other basis. In order to be
accountable to those bound by tribal law, it is critical that tribal leaders ensure
that they have dedicated the time, attention, and funding to accurately identify
and define custom law principles and that the public has notice and a real
opportunity to comment upon proposed tribal legislation, including such
custom law principles. It is also critical that tribal judges describe custom law
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principles and the rationale for their application in a particular case in writing
in each judicial decision - and that these decisions be publicly available.
X Debates About Working with Custom Nationwide
A. Debates over the Use of Custom
A review of the legal literature reveals two general positions concerning the
use of custom. The first position argues that custom must be considered as a
fundamental part of self-determination' and the second argues that the
consideration of custom is at best impractical and at worst simply a form of
resistance to all that Western legal culture represents.'73 From a tribal
government perspective, compelling arguments are made for the use of
custom. Zuni, for example, asks us to recall "the heavy hand of the federal
government" in the development of our current tribal court systems, which
should prompt a critical examination of the present state of our justice systems
and the pursuit of future developments by design and not by default.'74 She
also reminds us that our inherited systems are embedded in English history,
law, and values, including the concepts of private land ownership and
patriarchy.' Finally, she argues that there is a great danger in the use of
exclusively non-Indian approaches, as they will create a gulf between Native
people and their law where such law reinforces views that are contrary to
accepted local values. 76 Porter echoes Zuni's concerns but goes farther,
arguing that the use of the Western adversarial process itself tends to
breakdown relationships and community, thus compromising both persisting
traditional ways and tribal sovereignty.'77
172. Zuni, Strengthening, supra note 16, at 18, 23, 27; Barsh, supra note 8, at 74, 88-89;
Zion, supra note 8.
173. Joh, supra note 9, at 125.
174. Zuni, Strengthening, supra note 16, at 19.
175. Id. at 22-23.
176. Id. at24.
177. I do not think that Porter is suggesting that tribes do away with their adversarial tribal
courts completely. Rather, he clearly argues for the creation of policies and institutions for the
righting of relationships (such as peacemaking). Such institutions may be annexed to an
adversarial tribal court or be established privately, with encouragement from the tribal
legislature to the tribal court to work in tandem with them. Porter, supra note 8, at 237-39.
Barsh seems to wonder whether the breakdown in family attachments and social relationships
was a precursor to our reliance on tribal courts that function like state courts with their deterrent
weapons of economic penalties and incarceration.
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The persuasive arguments against the use of custom, as opposed to those
arguing that "it is simply too hard to use," come from both within and without
tribal communities. Some traditional people argue that custom cannot change
and should not be manipulated, and certainly should not be written down. 7'
Some argue that custom no longer exists, or that even if it does, times have
changed and not everyone will agree to its interpretation and application.'79
Finally, Joh argues that letting custom go could free tribal courts to focus their
attention on other priorities. 80
B. The Argument That We Should Not Mess with Custom
Older members can often be heard to insist that we leave the custom alone,
particularly that we not try to write it down. The problem is that custom is
being tinkered with all the time in a multitude of ways that we are not
noticing. If one thinks of custom and tradition as a smooth sandy beach and
tribal codes and resolutions as footprints, it is possible to imagine the smooth
outlay of custom and tradition being stamped out or disturbed with the passage
of each new law, be it intentional or not. The question then becomes, do we
want to alter it blindly or consciously with purpose?
Another important point is that there may be things about our tribal
governments that don't fit quite right or that don't seem just or fair as they are
based upon imported institutions and laws. For example, does it make any
sense to treat a child as abandoned and to involve the court and social services
simply because he is living with his grandma? In many ways grandma is
traditionally a third parent and the tribal children's (dependency) code should
reflect that fact. If we can't document and explore our custom, how can we
undertake the task of reform with due care and how can we build any tribal
institutional history? This is a conversation that we will need to have with our
leaders and elders, especially given that our children will have to live with the
institutions that we leave them.
C. The Argument That We Will Never Agree on the Definition,
Interpretation, and Application of Custom
Of course we will never all agree on what must be the applicable custom.
People the world over argue about the definition and meaning of law to further
their own interests or politics or simply given diverse viewpoints. Why would
178. See, for example, the reference to this argument in Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law, supra note
16.
179. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 9, at 122.
180. Id. at 131.
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defining custom law be any different? Further, just because not everyone
agrees with the definition and application of federal and state laws does not
make them inapplicable. If custom law is applicable, it is applicable. As
tribal members we can control the content of our laws through our political
systems, by voicing our positions in the legislative process, or by electing or
removing leaders consistent with our priorities or views. While it is true that
there will be times when we do not trust our leaders, and perhaps when we
cannot remove them, these are problems of politics or problems with the
distribution of power within our governments and are not necessarily
problems specific to our custom. There may even be times when abusive
leaders may justify their positions based upon certain customs. But this argues
in favor of discussing and clarifying what custom is.
D. The Argument That Custom Is Inapplicable to Modern Life and Its
Consideration Is Diverting Us from More Important Things
A frequently voiced argument is that certain customs are dead or that we
have simply outgrown them. Perhaps this is true for some tribal communities,
but I know that this is not true for many. Custom pervades our lives in ways
that we often cannot see or simply don't reflect upon. For example, even
though I live in California, I seem to care a great deal about how I am
perceived at home on the Hopi Reservation. The Hopi normative structure
still operates on me. We often over-estimate what has been lost.
It is suggested that tribes take up too much time and energy in working with
their custom and that this effort might be better spent, for example, dealing
with more important things like alcoholism or violence or with economic
problems. However, I suspect that these "more important things" are
intimately linked to and are involved in complex ways with our custom-and-
tradition concerns. Recently I was reviewing the 2004 Arizona Youth Survey
summarizing findings with respect to the Hopi Junior/Senior High School.
The survey was designed to assess school safety, adolescent substance use,
anti-social behavior, and the risk and protective factors that predict these
adolescent problem behaviors. Interestingly, the study found that one of the
few protective factors that Hopi teens benefit from is ceremonial
participation.' Turning away from our custom may actually make our more
important problems worse.'82
181. ARiz. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, 2004 ARIZONA YOUTH SURVEY: HOPI JUNIOR-
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL, at app. B (on file with author).
182. See EDUARDO DURAN & BONNIE DURAN, NATIVE AMERICAN POST-COLONIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Richard D. Mann ed., State University of New York Press 1995) (1949); Maria
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E. The Argument That It Is Difficult to Work with Custom Law
Legal scholars and professionals on both sides of the debate agree that it is
difficult to work with custom. Some of these difficulties include: (1)
inaccessibility given its oral nature; 3 (2) the need for community
participation and tribal government funding of field work (oral interviews,
documentation, analysis, and archiving); u (3) problems of authenticity where
members with knowledge and experience will not participate;" 5 (4) problems
of accuracy where outside sociological or anthropological studies are colored
by prejudice or mistake;"8 6 (5) problems with attorneys and advocates meeting
ethical obligations to discover and plead custom;'87 (6) problems with tribal
judges encouraging such pleading or taking judicial notice and documenting
its application;' (7) problems of essentialism (representations of pre-existing
human essences)'8 9 where it is assumed that there are "general Indian
Yellow Horse Brave Heart & Lemyra M. DeBruyn, The American Indian Holocaust. Healing
Historical Unresolved Grief, 8 AM. INDIAN & ALAsKA NATIVE MENTAL HEALTH REs. 60
(1998), available at http://aianp.uchsc.edu/ncaianmhr/joumal-online.htm (discussing the
historical unresolved grief of American Indians and its link to current social pathology in Native
peoples).
183. Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law, supra note 16; Zuni, Strengthening, supra note 16, at 24-25.
184. Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law, supra note 16; Zuni, Strengthening, supra note 16, at 25.
185. Job, supra note 9, at 120 n.22.
186. Id. at 120.
187. Zuni, Strengthening, supra note 16, at 25.
188. Id. at 26-27.
189. In order to offer further clarification of the concept of essentialism, I cite here at length
to the English Department's webpage at Emory University:
One of the central modes of representation is essentialism. Diana Fuss says that
essentialism is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of
things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the "whatness" of a given
entity. . . . Importantly, essentialism is typically defined in opposition to
difference .... The opposition is a helpful one in that it reminds us that a complex
system of cultural, social, psychical, and historical differences, and not a set of
pre-existent human essences, position and constitute the subject. ... In a
specifically postcolonial context, we find essentialism in the reduction of the
indigenous people to an "essential" idea of what it means to be
African/Indian/Arabic, thus simplifying the task of colonization. Nationalist and
liberationist movements often "write back" and reduce the colonizers to an
essence, simultaneously defining themselves in terms of an authentic essence
which may deny or invert the values of the ascribed characteristics (see
discussions on reclaiming the term "Third World," particularly in Chandra
Mohanty's "Introduction" to Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,
ed. Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres [ 1991] 1-47). Edward Said
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customs," or that a judge, because she is Indian, may take judicial notice of
most customs; 9 and finally, (8) difficulties with tribal court practice where
there is a lack of key professionals, Western legal training, funding, and where
custom may be invoked to justify the relaxation or virtual elimination of
procedural rules. 9 ' I argue here that solutions lie in strengthening our
institutional structures, including updated codes and rules, increased and
regular training, and consistent funding of custom documenting bodies and
projects.
XI. Problems & Solutions for Documenting Custom in General
Problems with the accessibility of custom can be overcome by establishing
and adequately funding permanent bodies mandated to document it. Other
societies generate self-studies in the form of historical accounts, sociological
and anthropological studies, and critical law reviews. They also compile legal
encyclopedias condensing - topic by topic - the legal principles applied by
their authorities over time (legal treatises). Such accounts, studies,
compilations, reviews, and treatises, while they are not enforceable legal
provisions like tribal codes or rules, provide a big picture backdrop for the
making and application of written laws. They also generate debate about the
deeper meaning of legal principles important to historical and contemporary
issues and spur innovation to solve current problems. Many tribes situate the
responsibility for the documentation of custom with the tribal legislature,
which then may further delegate it to a body of elders and/or culture-bearers.
This may happen informally or it may be implemented through code
provisions or rules that establish such a body, give it a mandate, and authorize
the tribal court to work in tandem with it.
argues against this inversion, suggesting that "in Post-colonial national states, the
liabilities of such essences as the Celtic spirit, ndgritude, or Islam are clear: they
have much to do not only with the native manipulators, who also use them to
cover up contemporary faults, corruptions, tyrannies, but also with the embattled
imperial contexts out of which they came and in which they were felt to be
necessary" (Culture and Imperialism [1994] 16).
Brian Cliff, Postcolonial Studies at Emory: Essentialism (Spring 1996), http://www.english.
emory.edu/Bahri/Essentialism.html.
190. Joh, supra note 9, at 120-21.
191. Id. at 123.
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A. Custom Documenting Bodies
It is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a comprehensive review
of tribal codes, resolutions, and case law establishing custom documenting
bodies. However, there are some generally known tribal provisions that I will
analyze here by way of example.192 Provisions establishing such bodies tend
to be found in tribal judicial codes. These bodies are often given a dual
mandate. First, they are mandated to document custom in topical areas
designated by the tribal legislature.'93 The preferred form of documentation
may take the form of a simple written "journal," or the high-tech "searchable
video archive."' 94 Alternatives in between might include audio and video
tapes and written transcripts. Second, these bodies are mandated to work with
tribal courts, either in a general advising capacity,'95 or as a decisional body
given questions of custom where the parties either agree to submit questions'96
or where a tribal judge certifies a question on her own.'97
192. See, e.g., WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE JUDICIAL CODE § 2.3 (1998), available at http://
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/whitemtn-apachejudicial.htm. Compare id. with
HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL CODE § 2.1.03 (2005), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/
hoopacode/t2civil.htm.
193. See, e.g., NATIVE VILLAGE OF BARROW JUDICIAL CODE § 3-7(E) ("The Elders Council
shall engage in ongoing documentation of custom in the following areas and in any other areas
deemed necessary and funded by Tribal Council: 1. How boys and girls are raised; 2. How
property is distributed, transferred, and inherited; and 3. Roles and duties in marriage .. ");
see also WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE JUDICIAL CODE § 2.3(A) ("In order that the ancient
wisdom, teachings and ways of the White Mountain Apache people may live on and continue
to guide the people in their daily lives, there shall be established an Apache Custom Advisory
Panel, whose functions it shall be: (1) To meet at the call of, and under the direction of, the
Tribal Council to discuss and record in a Journal their knowledge of the custom of the White
Mountain Apache people.").
194. See, e.g., NATIVE VILLAGE OF BARROW JUDICIAL CODE § 3-7(E) ("This documentation
shall be preserved in a searchable video archive, where possible and funded by Tribal Council,
or on audio tapes and video tapes, and in written transcripts."); see also WHITE MOUNTAIN
APACHE JUDICIAL CODE § 2.3(A) (establishing the Apache Custom Advisory Panel and
mandating that it meet to discuss and record its discussions in ajournal).
195. See, e.g., WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE JUDICIAL CODE § 2.3(A) ("[Tlhere shall be
established an Apache Custom Advisory Panel, whose functions it shall be ... (2) To be
available to the Tribal Court as advisors in matters of tribal custom.").
196. See, e.g., id. § 2.3(C)(1) ("If in a particular case there arises a question ofcustom which
has not been addressed in the Journal of the Apache Custom Advisory Panel, the parties may,
if they so choose, agree to the appointment of any three members of the Apache Custom
Advisory Panel to hear the facts of the case and decide the question.").
197. See, e.g., NATIVE VILLAGE OF BARROW JUDICIAL CODE § 3-5(E) ("If the judge cannot
take judicial notice of custom or tradition or if a question or dispute arises as to the existence
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Tribal legislatures vary in the weight and precedential effect they give to
custom found by such a body. In some cases, where the parties agree, the
body is empowered to decide the whole case, questions of custom and
disputed fact included. 9 But in other cases, it appears that the body is
empowered only to find and/or decide specific questions concerning custom,
which will then be applied as law, if deemed relevant, by the tribal judge in
tribal court."9 Some tribal legislatures have limited the precedential effect of
the custom law decisions of such bodies.2" Others rely on the precedential
effect of the tribal court opinions where they incorporate such body's decision
or recommendations concerning custom.2' In the latter case, the judge is
likely to modify or even "spin" the characterization or application of custom
somewhat to be consistent with the limited powers and remedies of the court.
This is a policymaking activity.
While I feel the urge to comment on the pros and cons of these various
approaches, I am hesitant to do so absent a review of the tribal court opinions
applying such provisions. Tribal statutory schemes can be like tailored
suits - a good fit for the particular governmental and cultural shape and
appearing in many different styles and sizes. I will say that the successful
operation of custom documenting bodies depends upon adequate levels of
funding that are consistently maintained. Also, budgets should provide for the
funding of technical support staff to do the actual taping, writing, archiving,
and records maintenance - lest we work our elders half to death with the
bureaucratic burdens of their mandate.
or substance of custom or tradition, the court shall certify that question to the Elder's
Council.").
198. See, e.g., HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL CODE § 2.1.03(a) ("The parties... must agree to
abide by the decision rendered by the person or persons that they determine to be the traditional
finder or finders of law and fact.")
199. See, e.g., NATIVE VILLAGE OF BARROW JUDICIAL CODE § 3-7(A) ("The Elders Council
shall decide [questions about custom] only when certified to them by a Tribal Court judge ...
Questions about customs or traditions shall be reviewed by the Elders Council de novo. The
Elders Council shall not decide questions of fact or relevancy ...."); see also WHITE
MOUNTAIN APACHE JUDICIAL CODE § 2.3 C.(1) ("[Tlhe Court shall apply the custom as
determined by the [Apache Custom Advisory] Panel.").
200. See also WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE JUDICIAL CODE § 2.3(C)(2) ("The decision of the
Apache Custom Advisory Panel members on a particular question of custom in an individual
case shall not be determinative of any case other than the one for which the determination was
made .... ).
201. See, e.g., NATIVE VILLAGE OF BARROW JUDICIAL CODE § 3-7 ("A decision of the Elders
Council shall not be binding precedent until it is incorporated into an opinion of the Tribal
Court.").
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B. Problems and Solutions for Working with Outside Experts and Studies
This is one of those areas where it may be helpful to borrow from, and
modify, Western law, particularly rules of evidence. A number of tribes
authorize their courts to consider outside expert testimony and studies in
identifying applicable custom law, sometimes giving the same or greater
weight to these sources than to customs found by elders or culture-bearers. As
can be seen from the first half of this article, reliable outside studies are
extremely useful. The problem for judges is discerning the difference between
romantic, racist, or simply erroneous characterizations based upon mere
opinion or fantasy, and field work, documentation, analysis, and conclusions
based upon reliable methodologies. I would also reiterate that outside studies
must focus on the appropriate legal level to be relevant and applicable. For
example, characterizations about Indians in general or Hopis in general may
be imprecise in a particular case and should not necessarily be relied upon to
frame applicable custom law.
A good starting point would be to look at the Federal Rules of Evidence
provisions governing professional expert witnesses and expert publications
(most state evidence rules are based on the federal rules). It would also be
instructive to look at comparative tribal imports and modifications of these
same provisions and how they have been applied in real cases.
C. Problems and Solutions for the Pleading and Proving of Custom
Many tribes today statutorily mandate the application of custom by tribal
courts, generally absent applicable tribal constitutional and statutory
provisions and applicable tribal common law.2" 2 Over the years there has been
a good deal of finger pointing between tribal judges, attorneys, advocates,
parties, and even elders and culture-bearers over who is ultimately responsible
for researching (or knowing) and formally raising questions of custom in tribal
court. Tribal judges in the early days argued that they could only address the
issues raised by the parties in their written pleadings or in their oral arguments
before the court. If a party hired a nonmember attorney or advocate to speak
for them in court and that person did not know or understand the local ways,
202. See, e.g., id. 3-1 1(A) ("The Tribal Court, in deciding matters of both substance and
procedure, in cases otherwise properly before the Tribal Court, shall look to and give weight
as precedent to the following mandatory authorities in the following order: 1. The Constitution
and Bylaws of the NVB Tribe; 2. Agreements with other tribes entered into by the NVB Tribal
Council; 3. Statutes of the NVB Tribe; 4. Resolutions of the NVB Tribe; 5. Common law of the
NVB Tribal Court; and 6. Custom of the NVB Tribe.").
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the party was simply out of luck because the tribal judge was not going to
notice custom for them. To be fair to the judges, in the early days, many of
them were nonmembers who could not be expected to know or understand
local customs.
Today, with the advent of revised codes, rules and further developed case
law, many tribes now require the judge to notice relevant, generally known
custom. 203 Additionally, a growing number of tribes have provisions or rules
setting out attorney and advocate responsibilities for the pleading and proving
the applicability of custom.2" Nevertheless there remain some significant
concerns. Primarily, who will pay the attorney or advocate to do the extra
work? In the Western system the parties pay. This is troubling, as it has been
my experience that it is usually the more traditional parties, particularly elders,
that need or want to assert the relevance of custom. They are usually the
parties least likely to be able to afford attorneys fees. The problem is a
structural one. Our tribal governments by default have put the financial
burden on our elders to find and plead custom. Where are our institutionally
mandated self-studies? Where are our custom law treatises or archives?
Where are our tribal bar study materials and exams requiring attorneys and
advocates to have some basic knowledge of our custom law? Tribal leaders,
and particularly tribal legislatures, need to give serious attention to shifting the
financial burden off of our more traditional and elder parties and onto
government where it belongs.
203. See, e.g., NAVAJO R. EVID. 5 (available at NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 204(a)
(2005)), citedin Dawes v. Yazzie, No. A-CV-01-85 (Navajo Sup. Ct. July 10, 1987) (requiring
the court to take judicial notice of Navajo traditional law if it is generally known within the
community - and famously restated in tribal law circles as "those facts every damn fool
knows"); see also NATIVE VILLAGE OF BARROW JUDICIAL CODE § 3-5(C) ("The court may take
judicial notice of Inupiat custom or tradition only if the court finds the custom or tradition to
be generally known and accepted within the NVB Tribal community.").
204. See, e.g., Hopi Indian Credit Ass'n v. Thomas, No. AP-001-84 (Hopi App. Ct. Mar. 29,
1996), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/1996.NAHT.0000007.htm ("A party
who intends to raise an issue of unwritten custom, tradition or culture shall give notice to the
other party and the court through its pleadings or other reasonable notice. The intent of this
notice is to prevent unfair surprise .... The proponent of Hopi customs, traditions and culture
must then (1) plead them to the court with sufficient evidence so as to establish the existence
of such a custom, tradition or culture and then (2) show that the recognized custom, tradition
or culture is relevant to the issue before the court. The relevancy of Hopi custom, tradition or
culture as to any legal matter should not be presumed.") (citations omitted).
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D. Problems and Solutions and Tribal Court Hearings to Find Custom
Assuming that custom is pled by a party and can't be noticed by a tribal
judge, there needs to be special rules for holding hearings to find it. Three
aspects of Western court process are likely to undermine custom law finding
goals. First, the evidence rules governing expert witness testimony are
designed for scientific expert testimony and will need to be modified to
recognize the expertise of local culture-bearers and elders, except in those
cases where it is being applied to outside experts. Second, in the Western
adversarial process, parties and their attorneys generally select their own
witnesses and the attorneys pose the questions to those witnesses. In a purely
adversarial process attorneys prioritize winning their case over accurately
identifying and applying custom. They are likely to select traditional experts
who will favor their client's positions. Consequently witness selection and the
questions to be asked of them will require more judicial supervision if there
is a commitment to accurately characterizing relevant custom. Third, court
rules of civil and criminal procedure permit aggressive questioning by
attorneys of expert witnesses. This discourages traditional experts from
participating in the custom law-finding hearings. There is a need to modify
the rules for questioning expert witness to balance encouraging knowledgeable
testimony on relevant customs with the right of the parties to challenge the
reliability of the testimony and applicability of the custom.
Some tribes follow a Western approach and allow for party selected
witness, subject to preliminary questioning and challenge for lack of
knowledge by the other party.2"5 Other tribes require judicial approval of the
witnesses selected by the parties." 6 In both situations, there are concerns with
205. See, e.g., HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL CODE § 2.1.04(c)(2)(A) ("[E]ach party shall be
allowed to call their own expert witnesses. The Court will determine how many expert
witnesses each party may call to testify except that each party shall be allowed to call the same
number of expert witnesses."); see also id. 2.1.04(c)(2)(B) ("Each party shall submit a list of
Tribal elder's names that they wish to call as expert witnesses. The opposing party will have
the right to voir dire the witnesses to determine if they are, in fact, knowledgeable of traditional
tribal law.").
206. See, e.g., In re Komaquaptewa, No. 01AP000013, at 74, n.16 (Hopi App. Ct. Aug.
16, 2002), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/2002.NAHT.
0000002.htm ("The Court should notice the village and the parties as to the hearing and its
purpose, offer guidance as to the kinds of witnesses it seeks, and explain in detail the narrow
purpose of a fact-finding hearing to find customary law. Depending on the specific law sought,
the judge should try to provide guidance to the Village and the parties for choosing their
witnesses. The parties and the Village should then submit a list of potential witnesses along with
explanations of the reason for their inclusion on the list, and the type of testimony they can
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hearing from traditional experts who will focus on defining relevant customs
and not testifying on the facts of the case. At least two tribes actively seek
"neutral" experts." 7 With respect to the questions, some tribes allow the
parties to initially frame the questions to be asked but authorize the judge to
approve the final list of questions to be asked.208 Other tribes give more
control to the judge by authorizing him to draft initial lists of questions, get
party feedback, and then to approve the final list of questions.2"9
Finally, considerations of fairness to the parties will require the holding of
multiple hearings, typically three or more including: (1) the initial hearing on
the disputed facts; (2) the custom finding hearing(s) where the judge hears
from the traditional experts and the outside experts; and (3) the fact-finding
hearing where the judge applies the custom law to the facts in dispute. The
last hearing is critical to ensuring a fair process as it gives the parties a chance
offer. Although the trial judge should give deference to the village's selection of witnesses, the
judge should exercise discretion in approving the final list.").
207. In the case of Smith v. James, No. 98AP00001 1, (Hopi App. Ct., 1999), the Hopi
Appellate Court directed the trial court to obtain a list of potential traditional expert witnesses
from the village where the dispute arose, in addition to party selected traditional expert
witnesses. See also HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL CODE § 2.1.04(c)(2)(A)(C) ("Each party shall also
submit to the Court a list of Tribal member's names that the parties believe to be neutral and
impartial, and knowledgeable of traditional tribal law. The Court shall select from the
submitted list names of individuals to act as expert witnesses for the Court."); id. § 2.1.04(c)(3)
("The Court may, but is not required to, accept recommendations of the parties before
determining the neutral and impartial expert witnesses that will testify before the Court. The
Court will determine how many neutral and impartial witnesses may testify except that the
number will not exceed the number of witnesses that each party will be allowed to call as expert
witnesses. The parties will have the right to Voir Dire the witnesses to determine if they are,
in fact, knowledgeable of traditional Tribal Law.").
208. See, e.g., HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL CODE § 2.1.04(d) ("After the expert witnesses have
been determined, the parties will submit to each other and the Court a list of questions to be
asked of each of the witnesses. A party may object to any question submitted by an opposing
party. The Court will then determine which questions will be asked of each of the expert
witnesses. The Court shall have the discretion to ask its own questions of the expert
witnesses.").
209. See, e.g.,Komaquaptewa, No. 01AP00001 3, 74, n. 16 ("Once the witness list has been
assembled, thejudge should present an initial list of proposed questions to the parties and permit
them to offer suggestions. The judge should be responsible for framing this list because this will
ensure that questions do not seek to establish matters, but instead seek to discern general
principles of village practice. Answers given in the initial testimony, however, will invariably
raise new questions. Therefore, in future hearings the parties should be afforded another
opportunity to provide additional questions in response to testimony. The judge can then
immediately return and ask these questions of the witnesses. Such a procedure will help
eliminate potential gaps in the law.").
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to make arguments and present evidence after they know what the applicable
custom law standard will be.2t °
Again, this is an expensive process for the parties. Clearly members would
benefit greatly from having the option to avoid litigation and to use traditional
or alternative dispute resolution processes such as peacemaking. However, it
is important to stress here that larger tribes are likely to require both
adjudicative and relationship-righting processes. Modem life has changed
member needs and expectations, causing them to forum shop - to seek a
decision in whatever process that will let them win. Many of us have
witnessed what happens in tribes where there is no tribal court or where the
only available dispute resolution forum is traditional or alternative. Tribal
members will run to state and federal courts to have their matters handled.
Zuni's admonition applies here. Do we want to have some control over the
way our people's disputes are handled and the laws, principles, and values that
will be applied to them or are we content to sit back and let change happen to
us? If we seek to control the direction of our future we will need to adopt or
amend court rules and rules of evidence accordingly.
Conclusions
The discussion of key concepts and the highlighted tribal provisions and
rules dealing with custom in this article are my attempt to focus the attention
of tribal leaders, judges, professionals, and academics inward. We now have
the education and expertise among us to reform our institutions and laws to fit
who we are and what we need. We should expect more from our
governments, including reasoned policymaking, targeted funding, and a
commitment to be accountable to the tribal public. The average American
expects no less from state and federal government. The process of reform will
generate important questions about the nature of law in general and the
definition of, and reinforcement of, applicable customs in particular. These
questions will need to be debated internally on an ongoing basis. At different
points in time consensus or compromise will happen. It is hoped that the
theoretical and analytical tools outlined here will assist with this process.
210. For an illustration of this problem, see Smith v. James, No. 98AP000011 (Hopi App.
Ct., 1999). This is the appeal of James v. Smith, No. CIV-019-94 (Hopi Tribal Ct. Apr. 17,
1998), described in the first half of this article, where the Hopi Appellate (Supreme) Court
vacated and remanded the trial court order with instructions to hold a new customary law
hearing and trial, specifically giving the parties the opportunity to make new arguments and
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE DISCUSSION OUTLINE FOR WORKING
WITH CUSTOM LAW FINDING COMMITTEES
I. How do we recognize and incorporate "custom"?
A. What terms and definitions should we use when
working with "custom"?
"Social Norm" vs. "Legal Norm"
"Tradition" vs. "Current Practice"
"Traditional Authority" vs. "Modern Secular Authority"
"Traditional Legal Levels" & "Secular Legal Levels"
"Policymaking "
1. "Social Norm" vs. "Legal Norm"
"Social Norm" - A felt standard of proper behavior
"Legal Norm" - A felt standard of proper behavior backed by
official recognition or sanction
Identify a social norm in your community. What is something that
everyone says you should or shouldn't do?
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Identify an unwritten legal norm in your community. What is something
that everyone says you should or shouldn't do? What happens to you if
you do or omit to do this thing?
2. "Tradition" vs. "Current Practice"
"Tradition" - Old values or ways of doing things
"Current Practice" - Current, generally accepted ways of doing
things
Identify a tradition in your community. What is the old way of doing
things? How have things changed? Is there a different current practice
for this tradition now?
3. "Traditional Authority" vs. "Modem Secular Authority"
"Traditional Authority" - The old offices or respected leaders
"Modem Secular Authority" - Constitutionally or statutorily
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Identify several traditional authorities in your community:
Identify several tribal secular leaders:
4. "Traditional Legal Levels" & "Secular Legal Levels"
"Legal Levels" - Legal norms vary within different, traditional
and secular legal levels, i.e., the custom law may be different for
different villages, clans, bands, etc., within one tribe. The
written tribal law (constitution, codes, resolutions, tribal court
opinions and orders) may also deal differently with people from
different villages, clans, bands, etc.




Village 2 Village 3 Hopi Coirt
Village Clan Leaders Village Board
Clan 1 Clan 2 Clan3
Clanllatiiarch Can Uncle
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Identify your community's traditional and secular legal levels. Identify a
norm that may be different from one place to the next. Is there written
tribal law that recognizes different norms/rules for different groups?
5. "Policymaking," Custom, & Tradition
"Policymaking" - When you formalize custom in your written
tribal law (constitution, code, or tribal court opinion), you are
engaging in policymaking - that is picking and choosing bits of
custom and putting them in your modem written tribal law - for
a good reason.
Custom or Tradition
Mother's Sister = Mother
Tribal Policy
Mother's Sister has a right to notice of
involuntary dependency hearings
regarding her sister's children
Can you think of an example where your tribe has done this?
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